At first glance, the
institutional set-up of the European Union very much looks like that of a
federal state. There is a directly elected European Parliament, a European
Commission in charge of executive governance, and the Council of Ministers, a
kind of superior legislative chamber with ultimate decision making power. It is
the construction of this Council of Ministers which resembles German federalism
most closely. First of all, its composition is based on the council
principle. The members are instructed representatives of the European
member-state governments. Their votes are similarly weighted as in the German
Bundesrat. Secondly, given the superior if not exclusive law making
powers of the Council (see below), the European system of governance is very
much one characterized by political interlocking rather than a separation
of powers.
This is almost where the comparison ends. Obviously,
since the European Union is currently composed of 27 member states with
different histories, large variations in their social, legal and economic
systems, and eleven different language, it can only be regarded as a case of
cultural federalism. Its formation almost literally repeats at the
European level the history of federalization in nineteenth century nation-states
(see chapter 4). Its rationale has been based on a historical compromise between
a shared desire to build a large integrated market, and an equally strong
commitment to the retention of cultural autonomy and self-governance. As in the
case of nation-state federations the question is to what extent the homogenizing
forces of the market will eventually transform the federal system from a
predominantly cultural one into an increasingly territorial one
The institutional framework of the
European Union departs farthest from the German, or, for that matter, any other
federal model. The European Parliament has only limited powers and certainly
does not follow the tradition of responsible parliamentary governance. The
executive Commission is appointed by the national governments and only partly
accountable to the Parliament. It is responsible for most European policy
initiatives, and it watches over their implementation by the member states once
the Council has approved them. That Council , on the other hand, operates more
like an institutionalised form of intergovernmentalism than a second legislative
chamber. As in Canadian First Ministers Conferences, for instance, changes to
the Union Treaties require unanimity. Only when setting up specific policies to
be carried within the framework of the existing Treaties, the Council has
increasingly adopted qualified majority voting.
With this eclectic mix of institutional arrangements, European governance
somehow falls into the category of plural power dispersal. As master of
the Treaties, the Council remains autonomous from parliamentary control and
accountability. The Commission acts as the main executive, and as a
semi-autonomous political entrepreneur for the entire process of integration,
coordinating communication and interaction among a large number of public and
private actors, member state governments, subnational regional and local
governments, interest organizations and social movements. The transnational
lobby in Brussels very much begins to look like its counterpart in Washington.
So does the large and growing number of direct financial support programs the
Commission administers.
A categorical
classification of the European Union’s functional division of powers and policy
making style is even more problematic. The Treaties have the character of
binding European law, and a very efficient European Court of Justice watches
over the member states’ adherence to them. Insofar as these member states
continue to be governed predominantly by national law, one can discern a
legislative division of powers. At the same time, however, the directives
and regulations which are put into place by the Commission on the basis of this
Treaty Law, have to be implemented and executed by the member states, and this
would point more into the direction of an administrative system of
federalism. Evidently, all this requires a high degree of cooperation.
Within the stipulations of the Treaties, the member states have agreed on a
common vision of integration. This process of integration has remained a partial
one, though, focusing on a common market in particular. A good deal of
competition remains with regard to both unregulated policy areas such as
social policy, for instance, and the general direction of the process of further
integration.
In sum again, the European Union is both more than just another international
organization, and less than a fully developed federal system. It is more than an
international organization with specific and limited objectives because the
achieved level of integration is unprecedented in quantitative as well as
qualitative terms. It is less than a federation because the process is still
ongoing and incomplete.
Note EU-Digest: Probably it will always be a project in development, which makes it so unique.
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