It’s
crumbling so quickly. Just two and a half years after American troops
came home, Iraq is back in crisis. And chaos in Iraq, a diverse nation
that stands as a buffer zone between the mostly Sunni Mideast and mostly
Shiite Iran, is troubling around the world. There were plenty of
warnings, of course.
How did we get there so fast?
A.D. 632: The centuries-old split between the Shia and Sunni Islamic denominations dates to the death of the Prophet Muhammad and a dispute over who should succeed him as leader of the Muslims. Sunnis are the largest branch of Islam but Shiites outnumber them in Iraq and make up the overwhelming majority of neighboring Iran.
1916: The uneasy borders dividing the Middle East were set during World War I, when the French and the English divvied up the lands of the defeated Ottoman Empire with little regard for religious or ethnic differences. Through wars and upheaval, the national borders they drew have pretty much held, largely by the force of autocratic rulers.
2003: A U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein and mayhem broke out. Saddam had ruthlessly held the nation together for more than two decades, favoring his fellow Sunnis while wiping out multitudes of Shiites and Kurds.
Americans, flush with the fervor that followed the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the U.S., hoped to replace Hussein with a friendly democracy. They met waves of bombings, massacres and kidnappings in sectarian fighting that peaked in 2006 and 2007, when additional U.S. troops began arriving and helped to temporarily.
2011: A return to factional warfare has been feared ever since U.S. troops pulled out after nearly nine years in Iraq. Americans urged Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to craft a government that would share power among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds and heal the national wounds. It didn’t work out. Sunnis complain they are excluded, imprisoned and abused by al-Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government.
Kurds have focused on building up their oil-rich autonomous enclave in northern Iraq.
2013: The situation in Iraq began deteriorating rapidly. Sunni protesters took to the streets, al-Qaida-inspired militants stepped up their attacks, and fighting from a civil war in Syria spilled over the border into Iraq.
The Islamic State’s bold and bloody sweep through northern and western Iraq this year belies its relatively small numbers — probably fewer than 10,000 fighters, according to U.S. intelligence estimates.
How could a force that size take Fallujah, site of the biggest battle of the Iraq War, and capture Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq?
For one thing, it’s the home team. Many residents of the Sunni heartland prefer the insurgents to al-Maliki’s government. That might change later if the group begins to enforce its Taliban-style version of Islamic law.
The Iraqi army is awash in corruption, desertion and battered morale. Many Sunni and Kurd soldiers and police feel little loyalty to Baghdad; they balk at fighting and killing their own people. When Islamic State fighters moved into Mosul, a security force of some 75,000 troops and police collapsed and scattered.
The Islamic State also appears to be getting help from Sunni tribes and elements of Saddam’s old Baath Party. The insurgents rolled into Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit without opposition.
Despite its threats, the Islamic State probably isn’t big enough to overrun Baghdad, the Shiite-heavy capital city of seven million people, much less conquer all of Iraq.
The real fear is that their campaign will spark a wider Sunni uprising, incite retaliation by Shiite militias and start a full-out religious war that could spread across the Middle East.
Read more: by CONNIE CASS Read more: South Florida Times: Miami , Broward, Palm Beach, Breaking News & Weather at SFLTimes.com
How did we get there so fast?
A.D. 632: The centuries-old split between the Shia and Sunni Islamic denominations dates to the death of the Prophet Muhammad and a dispute over who should succeed him as leader of the Muslims. Sunnis are the largest branch of Islam but Shiites outnumber them in Iraq and make up the overwhelming majority of neighboring Iran.
1916: The uneasy borders dividing the Middle East were set during World War I, when the French and the English divvied up the lands of the defeated Ottoman Empire with little regard for religious or ethnic differences. Through wars and upheaval, the national borders they drew have pretty much held, largely by the force of autocratic rulers.
2003: A U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein and mayhem broke out. Saddam had ruthlessly held the nation together for more than two decades, favoring his fellow Sunnis while wiping out multitudes of Shiites and Kurds.
Americans, flush with the fervor that followed the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the U.S., hoped to replace Hussein with a friendly democracy. They met waves of bombings, massacres and kidnappings in sectarian fighting that peaked in 2006 and 2007, when additional U.S. troops began arriving and helped to temporarily.
2011: A return to factional warfare has been feared ever since U.S. troops pulled out after nearly nine years in Iraq. Americans urged Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to craft a government that would share power among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds and heal the national wounds. It didn’t work out. Sunnis complain they are excluded, imprisoned and abused by al-Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government.
Kurds have focused on building up their oil-rich autonomous enclave in northern Iraq.
2013: The situation in Iraq began deteriorating rapidly. Sunni protesters took to the streets, al-Qaida-inspired militants stepped up their attacks, and fighting from a civil war in Syria spilled over the border into Iraq.
The Islamic State’s bold and bloody sweep through northern and western Iraq this year belies its relatively small numbers — probably fewer than 10,000 fighters, according to U.S. intelligence estimates.
How could a force that size take Fallujah, site of the biggest battle of the Iraq War, and capture Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq?
For one thing, it’s the home team. Many residents of the Sunni heartland prefer the insurgents to al-Maliki’s government. That might change later if the group begins to enforce its Taliban-style version of Islamic law.
The Iraqi army is awash in corruption, desertion and battered morale. Many Sunni and Kurd soldiers and police feel little loyalty to Baghdad; they balk at fighting and killing their own people. When Islamic State fighters moved into Mosul, a security force of some 75,000 troops and police collapsed and scattered.
The Islamic State also appears to be getting help from Sunni tribes and elements of Saddam’s old Baath Party. The insurgents rolled into Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit without opposition.
Despite its threats, the Islamic State probably isn’t big enough to overrun Baghdad, the Shiite-heavy capital city of seven million people, much less conquer all of Iraq.
The real fear is that their campaign will spark a wider Sunni uprising, incite retaliation by Shiite militias and start a full-out religious war that could spread across the Middle East.
Read more: by CONNIE CASS Read more: South Florida Times: Miami , Broward, Palm Beach, Breaking News & Weather at SFLTimes.com
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