The National Security Agency’s hackers have a problem.
Last week,
multiple outlets reported that
its elite Tailored Access Operations unit—tasked with breaking into
foreign networks—suffered another serious data breach. The theft of
computer code and other material by an employee in 2015 allowed the
Russian government to more easily detect U.S. cyber operations,
according to The Washington Post. It’s potentially the fourth large-scale incident at the NSA to be revealed in the last five years.
Now,
multiple sources with direct knowledge of TAO’s security procedures in
the recent past tell The Daily Beast just how porous some of the
defenses were to keep workers from stealing sensitive information—either
digitally or by simply walking out of the front door with it.
One
source described removing data from a TAO facility as “child’s play.”
The Daily Beast granted the sources anonymity to talk candidly about the
NSA’s security practices.
TAO is not your average band of hackers. Its operations have included
digging into China’s networks,
developing the tools British spies used to break into Belgium’s largest telecom, and hacking
sections of the Mexican government.
While other parts of the NSA may focus on tapping undersea cables or
prying data from Silicon Valley giants, TAO is the tip of the NSA’s
offensive hacking spear, and could have access to much more sensitive
information ripped from adversaries’ closed networks. The unit deploys
and creates sophisticated exploits that rely on vulnerabilities in
routers, operating systems, and computer hardware the general population
uses—the sort of tools that could wreak havoc if they fell into the
wrong hands.
That doesn’t mean those tools are locked
down, though. “TAO specifically had a huge amount of latitude to move
data between networks,” the first source, who worked at the unit after
Edward Snowden’s mega-leak, said.
The former employee said TAO limited
the number of USB drives—which could be used to steal data—after that
2013 breach, but he still had used several while working at TAO.
“Most
operators knew how they could get anything they wanted out of the
classified nets and onto the internet if they wanted to, even without
the USB drives,” the former TAO employeesai.
Read more: Elite Hackers: Stealing NSA Secrets Is ‘Child’s Play’
A recent report by the Defense Department’s inspector general
completed in 2016 found that the NSA’s “Secure the Net” project—which
aimed to restrict access to its most sensitive data after the Snowden
breach—
fell short of its stated aims.
The NSA did introduce some improvements, but it didn’t effectively
reduce the number of user accounts with “privileged” access, which
provide more avenues into sensitive data than normal users, nor fully
implement technology to oversee these accounts’ activities,
the report reads. Physical
security wasn’t much better, at least at one TAO operator’s facility.
He told The Daily Beast that there were “no bag checks or anything” as
employees and contractors left work for the day—meaning, it was easy
smuggle things home. Metal detectors were present, including before
Snowden, but “nobody cared what came out,” the second source added. The
third source, who visited TAO facilities, said bag checks were random
and weak.
Read more from the Daily Beast