Great Power Politics: American, China, Russia, and the Return of Great-Power Politics

U.S. foreign policy is, by most accounts, in disarray. Headlines—including in these pages—proclaim the death of global American leadership. Famous columnists send regular dispatches from the frontlines of U.S. President Donald Trump’s supposed campaign against the postwar liberal order. The damage to Washington’s standing in the world, we are told, is irreparable.

But step back from the day-to-day commotion, and a different picture emerges. In truth, the United States is gearing up for a new era—one marked not by unchallenged U.S. dominance but by a rising China and a vindictive Russia seeking to undermine U.S. leadership and refashion global politics in their favor. This shift in Washington’s focus has been some time coming. Elements of it emerged, mostly in a reactive form, under President Barack Obama. The Trump administration has gone one important step further, recognizing that great-power competition warrants rebuilding U.S. foreign policy from the ground up, and it has based its formal strategy documents on that recognition. When future historians look back at the actions of the United States in the early twenty-first century, by far the most consequential story will be the way Washington refocused its attention on great-power competition. Beneath today’s often ephemeral headlines, it is this shift, and the reordering of U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic behavior that it entails, that will stand out—and likely drive U.S. foreign policy under presidents from either party for a long time to come.

Read more at: American, China, Russia, and the Return of Great-Power Politics

Turkey: The pastor, the banker, and the irresistible drama in Turkish-US relations

US President Donald Trump once looked to be Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s biggest fan, uttering at a recent NATO summit: “I like him, I like him.” No longer.

This week, the US Treasury announced sanctions on two Turkish ministers over the case of Andrew Brunson, an American pastor who has been in jail for 21 months and who has been the subject of months of secret negotiations between Ankara and Washington.

Although the move is symbolic – given the plethora of bilateral disputes between the sides and Turkey’s drift away from liberal Western norms – the Trump administration’s decision could become a historic milestone for Turkey’s position in the West.

Nonetheless, in the unpredictable global environment we live in and with volatile leaders on both sides, it is also possible that this will end up being a detour in relations between the two long-time allies. As happened with Russia after the Turkish air force downed a Russian fighter jet in 2015, and with Germany following the Turkish authorities’ arrest of two dozen German citizens last summer, this crisis might blow over in seven or eight months, leading first to a thaw and then to normalisation.

Still, the events of this week are momentous – the first serious fissure between Ankara and Washington since the 1975 US arms embargo on Turkey following the Turkish incursion into Cyprus.

Using the Magnitsky Act, the Trump administration has imposed sanctions on Turkish Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gül and Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu, designating them “leaders of Turkish government organizations responsible for implementing Turkey’s serious human rights abuses” – and, as such, accountable for the decision to persecute Brunson on trumped-up charges.

Brunson has been living in Turkey for 23 years, running a small protestant church in Izmir. He was caught up in Turkey’s massive dragnet after the coup attempt, accused of “supporting terrorism” – as most foreign nationals detained during that period were – by way of his alleged links with both the Gülen movement and Kurdish separatists. It took more than a year for the authorities to produce an indictment – which turned out to be a jumble of espionage charges, secret testimonies, allegations of links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and local Gülenists, and an insidious plot to create an independent “Kurdistan” through the Christianisation of Syrian-Kurdish immigrants. A pro-government newspaper even claimed that, had the coup attempt been successful, Brunson would have been appointed as director of the CIA. It is troubling, if not unusual, for Turkish prosecutors to come up with wild accusations against foreign detainees. The practice reflects, above all, the emergence of a deeply paranoid security state that senses a threat from, as opposed to camaraderie with, Turkey’s traditional Western allies. German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yücel and human rights activist Peter Steudtner were similarly accused of “aiding an armed terrorist group”. The perception that the American “deep state” is behind the coup attempt and is harbouring Fethullah Gülen – a US-based cleric whose supporters played a leading role in the event – has now become the standard view in the Turkish bureaucracy. Turkey’s new national security ideology casts suspicion on foreigners, human rights activists, journalists, and liberal-leaning non-governmental organisations for knowingly or unknowingly participating in an effort to weaken or destroy Turkey.

But Brunson’s case is unique because his name has emerged as a rallying cry for the evangelical community in the United States – ultimately making the fate of the Presbyterian pastor a key issue in the strained Turkish-US relationship. When Erdogan held his first official meeting with Trump in Washington in May 2016, the White House organised a prayer vigil calling for Brunson’s release. 

Trump brought up the case three times during a luncheon with Erdogan that day and during subsequent phone conversations with Erdogan. Meanwhile, Congress has held hearings on the case and referred to Brunson in various legislative bills on Turkey. Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Trump supporters such as Jay Sekulow – an attorney on the president’s legal team who leads the American Center for Law and Justice – have all been involved in the Brunson saga. In this way, demands for Brunson’s release have become a permanent fixture in Turkey’s messy alliance with Washington.

Of course, the alliance is no less steady than a tired marriage mired in bickering and a litany of mutual grievances. Ankara has never quite forgiven Washington for not handing over Gülen. Turkey also objects to US support for Syrian Kurds affiliated with the PKK in the fight against the Islamic State group (ISIS). On top of this, the Turkish president has lashed out at the prosecution of Halkbank executive Hakan Atilla in a New York court case concerning the evasion of US sanctions on Iran. As Halkbank is one of Turkey’s largest state banks, Ankara fears that a US Treasury fine on the institution would trigger a domino effect in the Turkish financial system, at a time when the economy is experiencing a serious downturn.

In Trump, Ankara once had a sympathetic ear. From the get-go, the US president seemed eager to build a good relationship with Turkey’s strongman leader. This accorded with the prevailing view of the foreign policy establishment in Washington, which continues to believe that it is important to keep Turkey anchored to the West. However, Erdogan’s anti-Western rhetoric, poor human rights record, and decision to purchase Russian S-400 anti-aircraft systems have all made it harder for American friends of Turkey to make the case for improved relations. US officials have publicly warned that Turkey’s purchase of S-400s would jeopardise NATO’s defences and could result in US sanctions.

Meanwhile, Congress has introduced legislation that threatens to block the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey and also discusses the case of Brunson and Turkey’s imprisonment of US citizens and consular employees. (Several other US citizens, and two Turkish citizens who are US consular employees, remain in custody in Turkey; a third remains under house arrest.)

 One of the most dispiriting aspects of all this is that Turkey’s hostage diplomacy sometimes works. Ankara’s decision to return Yücel to Germany has led to the normalization of relations with Berlin and ended an unofficial German embargo on arms sales to Turkey.

 

Last week, the Turkish courts released Brunson from jail and put him under house arrest at his home in Izmir. But Washington saw this as a half-measure. Both Trump and Pence took to Twitter to threaten sanctions if Brunson was not released. US officials continued quietly looking into the possibility of using the Magnitsky Act to penalise Ankara

.

This drama even includes an Israeli sideshow. In expectation of Brunson’s release, Trump reached out to Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to ask for the release of Turkish activist Ebru Ozkan, who Israel jailed for allegedly aiding Hamas. The 27-year-old was released on 11 June, the day after Trump’s call. 

Erdogan has recently acknowledged as much, but said this week that Turkey never entertained the idea of a direct swap for Brunson. In a meeting this week, Turkey’s National Security Council said that “threatening” rhetoric against Turkey was “unacceptable.” 

 

Even in difficult marriages, divorce is not an easy choice. In the case of Turkish-US relations, there have always been considerations and strategic imperatives that prevented harsh measures against Ankara – such as Washington’s reliance on Incirlik Air Base, and goals of keeping Turkey out of Russia’s arms and maintaining an important NATO alliance in the Middle East.

But the mood in Washington seemed to change very fast this week. Following Trump’s threat of “large sanctions” on Turkey, Turkish officials attempted a quiet diplomacy with the US, offering to release Brunson at his next hearing in October. However, they appear to have misjudged Washington’s patience with the matter, as the sanctions announced this week suggest.

It is hard to predict how long this saga will continue but, as one US official noted, “this is just the beginning [of US measures]. Brunson must be released in the end.” Meanwhile, the knotty set of problems in the Turkey-US relationship – from S-400s to Syrian Kurds, F-35s, and the Halkbank fine – have all somehow become intertwined, with Brunson at the centre of it all.

Note EU-Digest: Again the dirty game of power politics. Also, what is quite interesting to note is that the US government leaders in the past and present have never been able to give some clear picture on the status of the Gülen movement in the US. What kind of a deal has the US with him, and why are they so tight-lipped about why he was allowed "to set up shop" in the US?

Read more: The pastor, the banker, and the irresistible drama in Turkish-US relations | European Council on Foreign Relations

Can Russia, India, and China unite to shift geopolitical gravity?

China is the world’s largest energy consumer and Russia is the world’s largest energy supplier. In the past, both countries have entered into a number of deals that have proved advantageous to both sides—considering their relationship in terms of being the largest consumer and producer of energy, respectively, and the fact that they share a border.

With China’s rapid economic growth in recent years being largely fueled by oil from the middle-eastern nations, China has been eager to diversify its energy sources, both in terms of geography and commodity. 

Getting its gas supplies from Russia, with which its shares its border, would definitely bode well for China.

The current Gazprom (OGZPY)-China National Petroleum Corporation (or CNPC) deal is as important for Russia as it is for China. Europe has been the primary gas consumer market for Russia. Having strained its relations with Europe in the recent months over its tensions with Ukraine, Russia is now eyeing the east where it intends to send a third of its gas exports by 2035.

If the European Union (or EU) stops purchasing gas from Russia, China would prove to be a bigger consumer of gas than the whole of the EU.

The deal will help the Russian gas giant Gazprom diversify its revenue sources. In 2013, gas sales to Europe and Turkey accounted for 32% of Gazprom’s total revenue. Europe continues to look for alternative sources to meet its energy needs, while the shale boom in the U.S. is changing the dynamics of the global energy market. Consequently, it’s become important for Gazprom to cut its dependence on Europe. China, Japan, and India could be crucial markets for the company as it looks to diversify.

Exchange-traded funds (or ETFs) like the Market Vectors Russia ETF (RSX) which has 8.63% of its holdings in Gazprom, and the WisdomTree Emerging Markets Equity Income Fund (DEM) which is invested 5.65% in Gazprom, seek to take advantage of the company’s growth trajectory.

Read more: Can Russia, India, and China unite to shift geopolitical gravity? - Yahoo Finance

Russian TV pokes fun at ruling tandem in New Year cartoon

Russia’s state television poked gentle fun at its ruling duo of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev, in a New Year cartoon of them dancing and singing on Red Square.

Amid fizzing speculation about which of the men will run for the Kremlin in presidential elections in 2012, the cartoon showed the two singing a duet with Medvedev playing the accordion and Putin the tambourine.

The sketch, shown on Channel One’s New Year gala show overnight, was essentially a sequel to a similar cartoon shown on the same day last year that was seen as a rare moment of satire on Russia’s tightly controlled television.

For more: Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan - Russian TV pokes fun at ruling tandem in New Year cartoon

DW: Speculation Grows Over Blair's Ambitions for EU President

For the complete report from the Deutsche Welle click on this link

Speculation Grows Over Blair's Ambitions for EU President

Even before the Lisbon Treaty was signed, speculation was rife as to who would be the first European president as proposed in the new document. Now it is signed and sealed, one man heads the list of potential candidates. The role, outlined in the treaty signed by the 27 member states at the end of last year, will replace the current system whereby each country assumes the rotating presidency for six months. The job, a two-and-a-half-year term, will be up for grabs in 2009 if the bloc's 27 member states can keep to their timetable and individually ratify the treaty over the next year. It now appears that former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has taken an early lead in the speculative stakes after he jetted into Paris for talks with French President Nicolas Sarkozy at a meeting of the right-wing Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party in Paris on Saturday.

Sarkozy has made no secret of his admiration for Blair and was the first and most vocal advocate of his potential presidency. "He is a very remarkable man. He is the most European of Britons ... it would be intelligent to think of him," Sarkozy said last year.

Note EU-Digest: Let us hope the EU will be able to have a universal vote with several candidates on who they want to have as their President and that we do not get a President shoved into our shoes. The whole of the EU needs to make the choice for a President not Mr. Sarkozy.

Asia Times Online - Turkey rallies its (political) troops - by M K Bhadrakumar

For the complete report from the Asia Times Online click on this link

Turkey rallies its (political) troops - by M K Bhadrakumar

Three developments within a week, and the visage of Turkish politics has changed beyond recognition: the military's warning to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) last Friday against pressing ahead with its candidate for the presidency because of his Islamist leanings; the constitutional court's ruling on Tuesday that invalidated the first round of voting by Parliament last week in which the AKP candidate, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, fell just short of the required two-thirds support; and the AKP leadership's subsequent announcement that it will dissolve.

Turkish politics is entering uncharted waters. No precedent from Turkey's troubled experience with democracy quite holds good as a compass for the protagonists. That includes the country's armed forces, the main political parties, and civil society.

EurActiv.com - Interview: Poland is seeking EU Treaty changes ( its all about self interest)

Polish EU Ambassador Jan Tombiński
For the complete report from EurActiv.com click on this link

Interview: Poland is seeking EU Treaty changes(its all about self interest)

"Poland’s newly appointed Permanent Representative to the EU, Ambassador Jan Tombiński, explains his country’s position on EU institutional reforms, the Russian ban on Polish meat, the Baltic pipeline and the EU's future prospects, 50 years after the Treaty of Rome was signed."

Question:President Kaczyński recently announced that he would put forward proposals for a Polish contribution to the EU Constitution. What will be the main elements of this proposal?"A major point of concern is the question of double majority in the voting system, even if the system is rarely applied in practice; however, this is the very core of the institutional change.Poland was granted a strong position by the Treaty of Nice, which is not reflected by the new voting system.