It seems highly unlikely that when Richard Nixon famously announced his visit to China 50 years ago he had much of an inkling of where relations between the US and the world’s most populous nation would lie today.
His diplomatic olive branch was firmly aimed at levering China away from the sphere of influence of its enormous northern neighbour and fellow traveller, the Soviet Union.
After 50 years of diplomatic sparring, the US and China are now openly rivals, seeking dominance in diplomatic clout, economic heft, military might,
Read more at:
US v China: the final verdict
Showing posts with label Superpower. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Superpower. Show all posts
10/19/21
3/3/19
USA: What does it take to destroy a world order? - Alfred W. McCoy
Once upon a time in America, we could all argue about whether or not
U.S. global power was declining. Now, most observers have little doubt
that the end is just a matter of timing and circumstance. Ten years ago,
I predictedthat,
by 2025, it would be all over for American power, a then-controversial
comment that’s commonplace today. Under President Donald Trump, the once “indispensable nation” that won World War II and built a new world order has become dispensable indeed.
The decline and fall of American global power is, of course, nothing special in the great sweep of history. After all, in the 4,000 years since humanity’s first empire formed in the Fertile Crescent, at least 200 empires have risen, collided with other imperial powers, and in time collapsed. In the past century alone, two dozen modern imperial states have fallen and the world has managed just fine in the wake of their demise.
The global order didn’t blink when the sprawling Soviet empire imploded in 1991, freeing its 15 “republics” and seven “satellites” to become 22 newly capitalist nations. Washington took that epochal event largely in stride. There were no triumphal demonstrations, in the tradition of ancient Rome, with manacled Russian captives and their plundered treasures paraded down Pennsylvania Avenue. Instead, a Manhattan real-estate developer bought a 20-foot chunk of the Berlin Wall for display near Madison Avenue, a sight barely noticed by busy shoppers.
For those trying to track global trends for the next decade or two, the real question is not the fate of American global hegemony, but the future of the world order it began building at the peak of its power, not in 1991, but right after World War II. For the past 75 years, Washington’s global dominion has rested on a “delicate duality.” The raw realpolitik of U.S. military bases, multinational corporations, CIA coups, and foreign military interventions has been balanced, even softened, by a surprisingly liberal world order -- with sovereign states meeting as equals at the United Nations, an international rule of law that muted armed conflict, a World Health Organization that actually eradicated epidemic diseases which had plagued humanity for generations, and a developmental effort led by the World Bank that lifted 40% of humanity out of poverty.
Some observers remain supremely confident that Washington’s world order can survive the inexorable erosion of its global power. Princeton political scientist G. John Ikenberry, for example, has essentially staked his reputation on that debatable proposition. As U.S. decline first became apparent in 2011, he argued that Washington’s ability to shape world politics would diminish, but “the liberal international order will survive and thrive,” preserving its core elements of multilateral governance, free trade, and human rights. Seven years later, amid a rise of anti-global nationalists across significant parts of the planet, he remains optimistic that the American-made world order will endure because international issues such as climate change make its “protean vision of interdependence and cooperation... more important as the century unfolds.”
This sense of guarded optimism is widely shared among foreign-policy elites in the New York-Washington corridor of power. The president of the influential Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass, has typically arguedthat the “post-Cold War order cannot be restored, but the world is not yet on the edge of a systemic crisis.” Through deft diplomacy, Washington could still save the planet from “deeper disarray” or even “trends that spell catastrophe.”
But is it true that the decline of the planet’s “sole superpower” (as it was once known) will no more shake the present world order than the Soviet collapse once did? To explore what it takes to produce just such an implosion of a world order, it’s necessary to turn to history -- to the history, in fact, of collapsing imperial orders and a changing planet.
Admittedly, such analogies are always imperfect, yet what other guide to the future do we have but the past? Among its many lessons: that world orders are far more fundamental than we might imagine and that their uprooting requires a perfect storm of history’s most powerful forces. Indeed, the question of the moment should be: Is climate change now gathering sufficient destructive force to cripple Washington’s liberal world order and create an opening for Beijing’s decidedly illiberal one or possibly even a new world in which such orders will be unrecognizable?
Read more: What does it take to destroy a world order? | Salon.com
The decline and fall of American global power is, of course, nothing special in the great sweep of history. After all, in the 4,000 years since humanity’s first empire formed in the Fertile Crescent, at least 200 empires have risen, collided with other imperial powers, and in time collapsed. In the past century alone, two dozen modern imperial states have fallen and the world has managed just fine in the wake of their demise.
The global order didn’t blink when the sprawling Soviet empire imploded in 1991, freeing its 15 “republics” and seven “satellites” to become 22 newly capitalist nations. Washington took that epochal event largely in stride. There were no triumphal demonstrations, in the tradition of ancient Rome, with manacled Russian captives and their plundered treasures paraded down Pennsylvania Avenue. Instead, a Manhattan real-estate developer bought a 20-foot chunk of the Berlin Wall for display near Madison Avenue, a sight barely noticed by busy shoppers.
For those trying to track global trends for the next decade or two, the real question is not the fate of American global hegemony, but the future of the world order it began building at the peak of its power, not in 1991, but right after World War II. For the past 75 years, Washington’s global dominion has rested on a “delicate duality.” The raw realpolitik of U.S. military bases, multinational corporations, CIA coups, and foreign military interventions has been balanced, even softened, by a surprisingly liberal world order -- with sovereign states meeting as equals at the United Nations, an international rule of law that muted armed conflict, a World Health Organization that actually eradicated epidemic diseases which had plagued humanity for generations, and a developmental effort led by the World Bank that lifted 40% of humanity out of poverty.
Some observers remain supremely confident that Washington’s world order can survive the inexorable erosion of its global power. Princeton political scientist G. John Ikenberry, for example, has essentially staked his reputation on that debatable proposition. As U.S. decline first became apparent in 2011, he argued that Washington’s ability to shape world politics would diminish, but “the liberal international order will survive and thrive,” preserving its core elements of multilateral governance, free trade, and human rights. Seven years later, amid a rise of anti-global nationalists across significant parts of the planet, he remains optimistic that the American-made world order will endure because international issues such as climate change make its “protean vision of interdependence and cooperation... more important as the century unfolds.”
This sense of guarded optimism is widely shared among foreign-policy elites in the New York-Washington corridor of power. The president of the influential Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass, has typically arguedthat the “post-Cold War order cannot be restored, but the world is not yet on the edge of a systemic crisis.” Through deft diplomacy, Washington could still save the planet from “deeper disarray” or even “trends that spell catastrophe.”
But is it true that the decline of the planet’s “sole superpower” (as it was once known) will no more shake the present world order than the Soviet collapse once did? To explore what it takes to produce just such an implosion of a world order, it’s necessary to turn to history -- to the history, in fact, of collapsing imperial orders and a changing planet.
Admittedly, such analogies are always imperfect, yet what other guide to the future do we have but the past? Among its many lessons: that world orders are far more fundamental than we might imagine and that their uprooting requires a perfect storm of history’s most powerful forces. Indeed, the question of the moment should be: Is climate change now gathering sufficient destructive force to cripple Washington’s liberal world order and create an opening for Beijing’s decidedly illiberal one or possibly even a new world in which such orders will be unrecognizable?
Read more: What does it take to destroy a world order? | Salon.com
10/8/17
EU-Russia Relations: Brexit Could Open the Door to Russia Joining the EU (and why not?) - by Cyrus Sanati
 |
| Could Russia become a full member of the EU? |
"Obviously the question now is: "why not? "
Tempting Russia with EU membership would do far more to elicit better behavior from Moscow than the weak economic sanctions the EU currently imposes on it. Russia’s entry would not only be a boon for trade in the region, but it would also finally make Europe a true superpower with the ability to take on China and the U.S. both economically and militarily.
At first blush, it might crazy to think “Rentry” could happen. After all, tensions between Russia and the EU are arguably at their highest level since the end of the Cold War. Last week, amid Russia’s continued aggression in the Ukraine, the EU extended its long-running banking sanctions against Moscow for another year.
Retaliatory Russian sanctions against EU foodstuffs will remain in effect as well, costing the EU agri-food sector billions of euros in lost revenue. Meanwhile, net foreign direct investment flows between Russia and Europe are now at their lowest level in nearly two decades, going from $80 billion in 2013 to almost nil last year.
And if the economic tension wasn’t bad enough, the Baltic states and Poland, which are all EU (and NATO) members, have increased their defense spending considerably following Russia’s invasion of the Crimea two years ago. They are increasingly concerned that Vladimir Putin, Russia’s long-standing leader, might try to reenact the opening scene of World War II and invade their territories. This might be paranoid, but it’s not totally off-base.
Still, despite the increased tensions and simultaneous crash in energy prices, Russia remains the EU’s fourth-largest trading partner and the EU continues to be Russia’s biggest trading partner; total trade between the two was nearly €209 billion in 2015, according to figures from the European Commission.
If energy prices rebound, which will happen sooner or later, those trade figures will explode. Back in 2012, before energy prices crashed and before sanctions were imposed, annual trade between the two equaled €338 billion, making Russia the EU’s third largest trading partner behind the U.S. and China.
If there was truly free trade and open borders between Russia and Europe, that number could easily double or triple in just a few years.
It will be hard for the sides to continue dismissing each other given their close geographical proximity and historical ties. Indeed, half of the European Union was either directly or indirectly ruled from Moscow at some point in the last century. As such, much of the infrastructure needed for trade—such as pipelines, roads, and railroads—are already connected. Today, Russia supplies nearly all he natural gas for many of the eastern members of the EU, as well as the bulk of Germany’s needs. As Germany continues to retire its nuclear and coal power plants, this link will only grow more important.
"The question is therefore not if, but when will both the EU and Russia start looking at their relationship in a more serious way, despite all the negative rhetoric coming from Washington about Russia."
EU-Digest
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