Over the years, Russia has served as the main arbitrator for
the territorial dispute between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region. The most vivid explanation lies in the past
relationship of Russia with these two countries both of which have been
former members of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet regime
unleashed an economic, social, and political chaos across the regions of
former member states. The end of the Soviet era granted independence to
every single member state of the Union. The absence of Soviet
supervision prompted the revitalization of old disputes between
countries that had centuries long territorial, religious, and cultural
conflicts.
The encounter between Armenia and Azerbaijan turned into an
active military warfare in 1988 when the mountainous enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh region – that historically has been populated by
Armenians of Artsakh – declared its willingness to join with the
neighboring Republic of Armenia. Azerbaijani government opposed to this
scenario and the war became inevitable. The conflict started in 1988 and
rapidly escalated to a full-scale war. In 1993, the newly independent
Armenians deployed military forces composed of local Armenians as well
as Armenians from diaspora that captured geographically significant
corridor of Lachin that provided a passage from Karabakh to Armenia.
Other successful military operations included the recapturing of Shusha,
Kalbajar, Qubadil, Jabrayil, Zangilan, Agdam, and Fuzuli.
Russia played a critical role in prevention of more violence in this war
that lasted nearly six years within the Nagorono-Karabakh region. In
May of 1994, the Russian government extenuated the ceasefire between
Armenian and Azerbaijani governments. The decree nurtured by Russia
became provisioned as satisfactory by both Armenian and Azerbaijani
forces that reached an armistice. The problem that Russia left unsolved
was that there was no definite and internationally agreed resolution on
the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The territories captured by
Armenian fighters were proclaimed as Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which is
a de facto state but is recognized as de jure by majority of
international community as still part of the Azerbaijan.
The circumstances are not favorable for any of the former
Soviet Union member states to make a swift transition from Russia’s
patronage into the Western democracy. Even though the strings are
invisible, however, Russia’s steeled hand still manipulates the strings
that move the internal and external activities of its post-Soviet proxy
states.
As it stands, the government of Armenia has formed an
illusory acquaintance in Russia and they believed that Moscow represents
the best interests of Armenian people. However, on numerous occasions,
the Russian government representatives and deputies such as Vladimir
Zhirinovsky (who many consider to be a controversial figure) have been
outspoken about Russia’s true image of Armenia as a country and an ally.
More specifically, when asked about the situation with Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict Zhirinovsky announced – “I could spit on Armenia and never
look back. If Armenians try to find another ally (other than Russia) we
will cut ties with them. If Armenians get on the way, Russia will let
Turkey and Azerbaijan run over Armenians. Armenia has no prospects of
economic growth.” Zhirinovsky is one of the many politicians who have
undermined the importance of Republic of Armenia as Russia’s ally.
In order to enhance the already existing economic cooperation with
Russia and its allies, and provide new avenues of military empowerment,
Armenia welcomed the invitation to join the Customs Union and became a
complete member in 2015. This step took the Russo-Armenian relations to a
higher degree and instilled more trust and sense of loyalty in the eyes
of Moscow administration.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet regime in most
communist countries of Asia and Europe did not necessarily represent an
end of the rivalry between Russia and the democratic West. The Western
countries never hesitated to take a backlash on Putin’s foreign policies
and his decisions during recent international crises such as, 1) the
Syrian Civil War that led to a chaotic situation in Northern
Middle-East, 2) the Ukraine-Crimea territorial dispute where Russia
intervened by claiming to resolve the issue but ended up annexing
Crimea, and finally, 3) the Nagorno-Karabakh land dispute, where Russia
protected the interests of the Armenians occupying those lands and
meanwhile sold firearms to both parties in war.
The final, yet nonetheless significant explanation of lack
of pro-Western diplomatic ties for Armenia is rooted in the reality of
Azerbaijan’s positive relations with the United States, European Union
member states and to a considerable degree also with Russia. Azerbaijan
was able to promote its pro-Western tendencies by re-shuffling the deck
of its cards that it used in global arena. It realized that since
Turkey, its big brother and guardian is one of the vital NATO members, a
crucial ally for the United States, and a possessor of an incredible
military and economic power in the region, then it should also begin
building similar connections with all of Turkey’s allies that can
potentially become Azerbaijan’s new sponsors for regaining the
Nagorno-Karabakh area.
Given this narrative, Azerbaijan was able to attract the
attention of then Senator Barack Obama, who visited the country in 2005.
By that time, the Section 907 implemented by the U.S. Congress in 1992
has been waived by President Bush, and further prolonged by Barack Obama
during his presidency. The Section 907 prohibited any form of direct
aid to or assistance to the Azerbaijani government. The relations
further strengthened during U.S war against the terror in Afghanistan
and Iraq when Azerbaijan provided intelligence information, airspace
access, and refueling of U.S. aircrafts.
Azerbaijan also active
participated in the NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.
In the economic sphere, Azerbaijan primarily currently
cooperates with the US in the exportation of its energy resources to
global markets, and particularly in Western Europe. The United States
realizes the potential economic gain from the natural resources such as
oil and gas available in Azerbaijan, as well as the geographical
location of Azerbaijan and the access to Caspian Sea.
The United States
will continue to create stable ties with Azerbaijan in order not to lose
a potential important ally to Russia. Also, the United States does not
rest on the matters pertaining to the security of the Azerbaijani
people.
Within the context of Nagorno-Karabakh territorial dispute,
it can reasonably be argued that Russia pulls the strings on Armenia as a
“marionette,” whereas, the United States implements the same tactic
with Azerbaijan. Ultimately, both superpowers defend their own security
interests by offering partnership to the disputing states in the
Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
It becomes paradoxical when one
realizes that in this situation these two conflicting states do not have
any alternative options that can bring the resolution of the conflict
in their favor, with Azerbaijan desiring to regain Karabakh enclave, and
Armenia dearly holding on to every inch of the soil with the last drop
of the blood. Alas, serving for the advancement of the global
superpowers and their regional interests is the only way of survival for
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Read more: Armenia and Azerbaijan are Stuck with Russia and the U.S.
