China-Russia Relations: No Limits’? Understanding China’s Engagement With Russia on Ukraine – by Igor Denisov

Vladimir Putin’s last visit to China took less than half a day. The Russian president landed in Beijing on the afternoon of February 4 and left for Moscow the same day, shortly after the evening Opening Ceremony of the Winter Olympics. Putin didn’t even attend the next day’s banquet, at which Chinese President Xi Jinping toasted foreign dignitaries. To fit in with the Russian leader’s tight schedule, Xi arrived at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse instead of receiving Putin, like the other guests, at the Great Hall of the People.

There is much speculation on whether the primary purpose of Putin’s swift visit was to brief the Chinese leader on the upcoming military operation in Ukraine and secure Beijing’s backing. Many believe that, yes, Xi knew everything in advance; moreover, some say Xi specifically asked Putin to carry out the operation only after the Olympics’ Closing Ceremony.

There is little evidence that the two leaders’ talks and working dinner on February 4 focused on the internal dynamics in Ukraine. Still, NATO and the activities of U.S.-centric alliances in the Asia-Pacific may well have been discussed. While Ukraine is totally absent from the joint statement approved by Putin and Xi, criticism of the Western bloc’s policies affecting the two countries’ security is prominently present.

Read more at:‘No Limits’? Understanding China’s Engagement With Russia on Ukraine – The Diplomat

The Return of Realpolitik — by William C. Wohlforth

A narrative has taken hold around the world that might be titled “the return of Realpolitik.” From the happy days of globalization in the 1990s to the frenzied war on terror and associated counterinsurgency struggles of the first decade of the 2000s, the argument goes, great powers and geopolitics are back. Walter Russell Mead put this conventional wisdom well: “Whether it is Russian forces seizing Crimea, China making aggressive claims in its coastal waters, Japan responding with an increasingly assertive strategy of its own, or Iran trying to use its alliances with Syria and Hezbollah to dominate the Middle East, old-fashioned power plays are back in international relations.”

Many analysts portray current contestation as the leading edge of a full-blown conflict over the U.S.-led global order. That is the meaning of the oft-heard claim that “unipolarity” has ended and new conflict-prone multipolar order has emerged. That is what underlies the increasingly popular 1914 analogy likening China’s rise today to Germany’s pre-World War I ascent. Others reject this as alarming, claiming that the liberal global order is robust and able to continue absorbing new states into its ranks. As rising states like China grow, John Ikenberry contends, they “will have more ‘equities’ to protect, and this will lead them more deeply into the existing order.”

A careful look at power realities leads to a more nuanced position. Realpolitik is about the relationship between material capabilities – “hard power” in today’s parlance – and legitimacy, influence, the ability to achieve desired outcomes. From that perspective, power politics is not “back” after having been away on some vacation. It has always been here. It was here when the Cold War ended, when the Soviet Union collapsed, when the U.S.-led alliance of the “Broader West” expanded its aims and influence in the 1990s. Indeed, missing from Mead’s list of “power plays” is the country that remained highly active all along: the United States. What is different today is that power plays are more visible because other countries are pushing back harder. There is nothing new about China’s maritime claim or its views about the U.S. presence in Asia. Nor is there anything new about Russia’s dissatisfaction with the expansion of Western security institutions near its borders. What is new is the willingness of these governments to press their case more forcefully.

Read more at: The Return of Realpolitik — Russia in Global Affairs

Turkey "Realpolitik: War in Ukraine: Erdogan’s greatest challenge yet –

As the spectre of war in Ukraine looms over Europe, what individual NATO members do – or choose not to do – will have a geopolitical impact on how any conflict unfolds.

When it comes to Ukraine, Turkey is no ordinary NATO member. It has recently been selling armed drones to Kyiv – some of which the Ukrainian military has already used in Donbas, to great effect, against pro-Russian targets. Turkey is also a close ally of Russia, and a key trading partner – and Ankara has been careful not to step on Moscow’s toes across different conflict

Under Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin, Turkey and Russia share much more than meets the eye. The two resurgent powers want to shake up the post-Soviet world order, they each have a disdain for liberal norms, and they both want a greater role on the world stage for their respective countries. Turkey and Russia have also developed a unique form of relationship, often dubbed “competitive cooperation,” whereby they back opposing sides in conflicts in Libya, Syria, and the South Caucasus but do so in a way that recognises each other’s expanding sphere of influence.

This unique relationship between Erdogan and Putin can be hard for Western countries to fully comprehend. In 2014, Turkey criticised the Russian invasion of Crimea but did not join the US-led sanctions against Russia. In 2017, Turkey signed a deal to buy the Russian-made S-400 missile system and, against American objections, received it in 2019, despite the threat of US sanctions.

Read more at: War in Ukraine: Erdogan’s greatest challenge yet – European Council on Foreign Relations

Realpolitik: Turkey and US unite to oust Isis and curb Kurds

Turkish tanks have moved rapidly through the Syrian town of Jarablus on Wednesday, ousting Islamic State from one of its last border strongholds – but the most important outcome in Ankara’s eyes was beating the US-backed Kurdish fighters in a race to seize the surrounding area.

In a pointed concession to Turkey, the US vice president Joe Biden demanded that Kurdish forces, who had been a central US proxy in the battle against the terrorist group, “move back across the Euphrates river”, to the east of Jarablus. He also said that the Kurds, who have won a series of recent battles against Isis, would be abandoned if they advanced. US jets gave cover to the Turkish push, one of the first times in the war that the two allies have conducted a joint operation.

“They cannot, will not, under any circumstance get American support if they do not keep that commitment,” Biden said in Ankara during a visit to reset ties with Turkey, which had been strained since the failed coup attempt in July.

Joe Biden reassured Ankara, but it is unclear how Washington’s Kurdish proxies will react to his demand that they step back

Read more: Turkey and US unite to oust Isis and curb Kurds | World news | The Guardian

Turkey: Realpolitik ? What's behind Turkey's rapprochement moves towards Israel and Russia? - by David Barchard

Realpolitik or "Axis of Evil?

Turkey and Israel have agreed to bury their differences after a bitter dispute froze their relations for six years and have normal diplomatic relations, including ambassadors in each other’s capitals.

Given the long-standing public distaste of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for Israel, and Turkish support for the people of Gaza, the news marks a massive policy turnaround. But it has been in the making for a while.

To soften any shock, news of the deal – some pro-government papers are even using the word "reconciliation" – between Turkey and Israel was signalled well in advance of its announcement on Sunday evening. President Erdogan also phoned the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, on Sunday to give him advance news of the agreement.

News of negotiations between Turkey and Israel has in fact been emerging steadily since late last year, with reports that despite their differences, they had discovered that they needed each other as both regional and energy partners.

Unfinished business from the recent past is being finally got out of the way. Israel will pay Turkey $20 million as compensation to the families of 10 Turkish citizens who died in May 2010 when the Israeli army stormed an unarmed humanitarian convoy carrying relief supplies to Gaza. It has renewed its apology, first issued in 2013, for the attack. The payment of compensation, withheld until now, makes the apology substantial. It will also allow a 10,000-tonne shipload of humanitarian supplies from Turkey to unload at Gaza on Friday this week.

Both sides are portraying the agreement – which will be signed on Tuesday this week – as a victory of sorts. Turkey’s Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim, says that Turkey has secured the easing (though not the complete lifting) of the Israeli blockade on Gaza. Turkey is building homes and engaging in other projects to help the people of Gaza. Hamas officials will continue to operate from offices in Turkey.

However according to the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Gaza blockade will continue, while Israel will now be able to strike an agreement with Turkey for the export of its newly discovered natural gas reserves to Europe via a pipeline. The two prime ministers issued details of the agreement simultaneously, perhaps in order to lessen domestic criticism in both countries.

For this is an agreement dictated on both sides not by sentiment but by realpolitik – national self-interest. With memories of the events of 2010 and afterwards still fresh, it looks very vulnerable to any possible fresh flare up in Gaza. But for the countries making it, the agreement is solidly underpinned by practical advantages on both sides.

Turkey has been looking for potential alternative suppliers of natural gas to take the place of the Russians, since relations were frozen following the downing of a Russian air force jet on the Syrian border on 24 November. Israeli gas would be a logical alternative, at least for some years.
However there are signs that Russia’s diplomatic and economic freeze against Turkey could also be about to lift, with a statement of "regret" about the jet incident from Erdogan on Monday.
Though Russia seemed to have set its face firmly against future relations with Turkey – and banned all agricultural imports – there have been signs in the last few weeks that Moscow was responding slowly to indications from Turkey that it wanted to normalise relations. 

The freeze in Turkish-Russian relations has not only hit Turkish food producers hard. Hotel bookings are said to be nearly 98 percent down and there has been uncertainty about future energy cooperation, including the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear power-plant at Akkuyu on the Mediterranean. Turkey’s media has continued to criticise Russian operations in Syria, but President Erdogan and Prime Minister Yildirim both made it clear that they wanted the restoration of relations.

The sticking point was a formal apology from President Erdogan for the shooting down of the Russian jet and the death of one of its pilots. According to Russian media sources, later confirmed by Ibrahim Kalin, a spokesperson for the Turkish president, it seems that Erdogan used a form of words in a private letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin asking relatives of the dead pilot to "excuse us". President Putin regards this as a sufficient apology - so normal relations look like being resumed.

If that does happen, one of Moscow's main moves is likely to be a continued guarantee of Russian natural gas supplies to Turkey - which in any case have so far not been interrupted. How far this would undermine a potential Turkish deal with Israel (by removing the need to buy additional gas) is unclear, but having come so far towards a deal with Israel neither Turkey nor the Israelis look likely to turn back easily.

 Read more: What's behind Turkey's rapprochement moves towards Israel and Russia? | Middle East Eye