The Turkish
political scene has been rocked by accusations of corruption since
December 2013, when a number of people, including government officials
and private citizens close to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, were
arrested as part of a crackdown on graft. Meanwhile, the Erdoğan-led
government is enacting policies that degrade rule of law in the country,
with sudden policy shifts in the judiciary and the intelligence
service, as well as an ongoing clampdown on media and individual freedoms.
The government’s response to the accusations of corruption has been so severe that it has been seen as an attempt to cover up unpleasant realities. Ultimately, it is the sign of a fierce battle that Prime Minister Erdoğan is waging to retain his power. The crisis is likely to deepen in the run-up to critical elections in 2014—local elections in March and a presidential vote in August.
But the implications of this crisis reach beyond ballot-box politics. Turkey’s domestic tumult is threatening the country’s economic and international interests. After twelve years of unprecedented political stability and economic progress, new political uncertainties have led to a deterioration in the country’s financial ranking and currency and have dented Turkey’s international standing. The frequent allegations and momentous revelations of corruption have added uncertainty to the politics and economics of a country that had become a symbol of progress to many observers.
With a deepening of the crisis likely unavoidable, the citizens of Turkey are not the only ones at risk. External players, first and foremost the European Union, have much to worry about, too.
In domestic political terms, there are several possible paths Turkey could follow. In the first scenario, Prime Minister Erdoğan becomes Turkey’s next president in August’s election. If that happens, he will have the same limited powers as the current president, Abdullah Gül—but with major differences.
The new president will be the first to be directly elected, so he will have an extra layer of legitimacy. Given Prime Minister Erdoğan’s personality, he will likely bring his forceful, vocal political style to the presidency. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will almost certainly use some of the powers that Abdullah Gül has refrained from using, for example chairing weekly meetings of the Turkish cabinet, which will allow him to micromanage the government’s affairs. And, logically, to achieve that aim, President Erdoğan is bound to choose an obedient prime minister.
As a result of such a massive deterioration of the rule of law, international interest is waning. The EU and the United States are highly concerned. The Turkish government’s dual narrative on the issue—pretending everything is perfect while scrapping many of the basic rules—has ended up tiring Turkey’s most enthusiastic friends in European governments and parliaments, including the European Parliament. After all, if European leaders and parliamentarians are constantly tossed back and forth by the Turkish government’s adverse statements and proclamations of strategic interest, why should they risk appearing naively supportive of a volatile country at a time when Europe’s own public has become inward-looking? More generally, the government’s argument—put forward for more than a decade—depicting Turkey as a strategic addition to the EU has now largely vanished.
In a country like Turkey—so heavily dependent on its international connections for trade, investment, research and technology, and education and security—a sharp deterioration in relations with partner countries is not a benign occurrence. Rather, it is a cause for serious concern, especially in view of the lack of alternatives.
From a foreign observer’s point of view, it is striking that the corruption revelations were obtained through phone intercepts outside the law, while the government’s response was to quickly change the relevant legal framework and shift thousands of officials to other positions.
It may well be that Turkey will have irreversibly slid toward the “Russia model.” In addition, there is another consideration on European minds: jettisoning the accession negotiations now may well reinforce Prime Minister Erdoğan’s authoritarian inclinations and leave Turkey’s liberals in the cold, leading to a more polarized and unpredictable country.
In the short term, muddling through may well be the most convenient way out for both Turkey and Europe. After all, in foreign policy, the worst outcome is not always a certainty. One thing is certain, however: It has taken Turkey over a decade to build stability, economic success, and diplomatic respectability. It has taken only a few weeks in 2013 and 2014 to shatter that hard-earned image. Climbing out of the hole again will be long and painful
For complete report: How Far Backward Is Turkey Sliding? - Carnegie E
The government’s response to the accusations of corruption has been so severe that it has been seen as an attempt to cover up unpleasant realities. Ultimately, it is the sign of a fierce battle that Prime Minister Erdoğan is waging to retain his power. The crisis is likely to deepen in the run-up to critical elections in 2014—local elections in March and a presidential vote in August.
But the implications of this crisis reach beyond ballot-box politics. Turkey’s domestic tumult is threatening the country’s economic and international interests. After twelve years of unprecedented political stability and economic progress, new political uncertainties have led to a deterioration in the country’s financial ranking and currency and have dented Turkey’s international standing. The frequent allegations and momentous revelations of corruption have added uncertainty to the politics and economics of a country that had become a symbol of progress to many observers.
With a deepening of the crisis likely unavoidable, the citizens of Turkey are not the only ones at risk. External players, first and foremost the European Union, have much to worry about, too.
In domestic political terms, there are several possible paths Turkey could follow. In the first scenario, Prime Minister Erdoğan becomes Turkey’s next president in August’s election. If that happens, he will have the same limited powers as the current president, Abdullah Gül—but with major differences.
The new president will be the first to be directly elected, so he will have an extra layer of legitimacy. Given Prime Minister Erdoğan’s personality, he will likely bring his forceful, vocal political style to the presidency. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will almost certainly use some of the powers that Abdullah Gül has refrained from using, for example chairing weekly meetings of the Turkish cabinet, which will allow him to micromanage the government’s affairs. And, logically, to achieve that aim, President Erdoğan is bound to choose an obedient prime minister.
As a result of such a massive deterioration of the rule of law, international interest is waning. The EU and the United States are highly concerned. The Turkish government’s dual narrative on the issue—pretending everything is perfect while scrapping many of the basic rules—has ended up tiring Turkey’s most enthusiastic friends in European governments and parliaments, including the European Parliament. After all, if European leaders and parliamentarians are constantly tossed back and forth by the Turkish government’s adverse statements and proclamations of strategic interest, why should they risk appearing naively supportive of a volatile country at a time when Europe’s own public has become inward-looking? More generally, the government’s argument—put forward for more than a decade—depicting Turkey as a strategic addition to the EU has now largely vanished.
In a country like Turkey—so heavily dependent on its international connections for trade, investment, research and technology, and education and security—a sharp deterioration in relations with partner countries is not a benign occurrence. Rather, it is a cause for serious concern, especially in view of the lack of alternatives.
From a foreign observer’s point of view, it is striking that the corruption revelations were obtained through phone intercepts outside the law, while the government’s response was to quickly change the relevant legal framework and shift thousands of officials to other positions.
It may well be that Turkey will have irreversibly slid toward the “Russia model.” In addition, there is another consideration on European minds: jettisoning the accession negotiations now may well reinforce Prime Minister Erdoğan’s authoritarian inclinations and leave Turkey’s liberals in the cold, leading to a more polarized and unpredictable country.
In the short term, muddling through may well be the most convenient way out for both Turkey and Europe. After all, in foreign policy, the worst outcome is not always a certainty. One thing is certain, however: It has taken Turkey over a decade to build stability, economic success, and diplomatic respectability. It has taken only a few weeks in 2013 and 2014 to shatter that hard-earned image. Climbing out of the hole again will be long and painful
For complete report: How Far Backward Is Turkey Sliding? - Carnegie E
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