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One of the most overused cliches in contemporary U.S. diplomacy is Ronald Reagan’s invocation of a Russian proverb: “Trust but Verify.” Originally used in the context of the Cold War, it conveyed that Washington should be willing to reach agreements with its adversaries but only if it could be sure the other side would live up to its commitments. It was a nice way to indicate both flexibility and toughness, which is of course why people refer to it whenever the United States is contemplating new negotiations with one of its adversaries.

Implicit in Reagan’s dictum is the idea that Americans are honest, plain-speaking truth-tellers who can be counted upon to keep their word and fulfill their promises. America’s opponents, by contrast, are a slippery bunch of deceptive charlatans who will exploit any loophole and seize any opportunity to hoodwink the country. Accordingly, U.S. negotiators must insist on all sorts of intrusive measures — such as the extraordinarily stringent inspection regime incorporated into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran — to make sure they can verify what others are really up to. Reagan’s proverb notwithstanding, the importance the United States attaches to verification is really a reminder that there is damn little trust involved.

Lately, however, I’ve been wondering whether this wariness has things backward. Is the real problem that Washington can’t trust others, or rather that other states can’t trust it?

 Even before Deceitful Donald showed up, the United States had amassed a pretty good record of reneging on promises and commitments. At a minimum, Washington cannot claim any particular virtue or trustworthiness in its dealings with others. In the unipolar era, in fact, the United States repeatedly did things it had promised not to do.

To be sure, this is how one expects great powers to behave, especially when important matters are at stake. The Athenians famously told the Melians that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” and that logic did not escape U.S. leaders throughout the country’s history. Think about all the treaties U.S. officials signed with various Native American tribes and subsequently broke, modified, or reneged upon as the nation expanded steadily across North America. Or consider the Nixon shocks of 1971, when the United States unilaterally ended convertibility of the dollar into gold, in effect dismantling the Bretton Woods economic order it had helped create. President Richard Nixon also slapped a 10 percent surcharge on imports to make sure the U.S. economy didn’t suffer as the dollar rose in value

Or consider some more recent events. As more and more documents come to light, it has become clear that U.S. officials convinced their Soviet counterparts to permit German reunification by promising that NATO would not expand further. Secretary of State James Baker told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not go “1 inch eastward” and Gorbachev received similar assurances from a host of other Western officials as well. President Bill Clinton’s administration blithely ignored these assurances, however, in its overzealous rush to create what it thought would be a “zone of peace” well to the east. As a number of observers warned at the time, this decision poisoned relations with Moscow and was the first step leading back to the level of confrontation we are dealing with today. That blunder was compounded by the George W. Bush administration’s decision to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. While technically not a breach of trust (i.e., the treaty permitted either party to leave if it wished, provided it gave adequate notice), it was still a clear signal that the United States didn’t care about preserving good relations with Moscow and was  Stephen R. Weissman has shown in an important article, regime change was on U.S. officials’ minds from the get-go, and they soon blew right past the terms of the resolution. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates later recalled, “The Russians felt they had been played for suckers on Libya. They felt there had been a bait and switch.” And they were right. So, if you’re ever wondering why Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly blocked Security Council action over the disaster in Syria, there’s at least part of your answer.

Needless to say, the lessons of Libya have not been lost on other countries. North Korean media have repeatedly invoked this example to justify the country’s nuclear weapons program and to warn against ever trusting assurances from the United States. And it doesn’t take a genius to figure out why. If you were Kim Jong Un, would you rather pin your survival on a nuclear deterrent of your own or promises from the United States?

Which brings us to Donald Trump. The world is now dealing with a U.S. president who appears to have no firm convictions or beliefs, the attention span of a hummingbird, and who apparently makes important national security decisions on the basis of whatever fairytale he just saw on Fox & Friends. As near as one can tell, he never saw a treaty or agreement signed by his predecessor that he liked, even though he has trouble explaining what’s wrong with any of them. He just likes to talk about “tearing them up” no matter what the consequences may be.

Trump is also a serial fabulist who lies with facility and frequency yet has yet to pay any political penalty for his disinterest in truth. Determined to outdo his predecessor in every way, Trump uttered six times as many falsehoods in his first 10 months as president as Obama did in his entire two terms. Add to that the frenetic pace of turnover within the White House and the cabinet, and you 

Under these conditions, why would any sensible government take America’s word for anything? Why would any halfway smart adversary make substantial concessions to the United States in exchange for U.S. promises, assurances, or pledges? Why offer up a quid in exchange for its pro quo? Based on its recent track record, and the character of the current U.S. president, no adversary would concede a thing unless it were 100 percent certain the United States would deliver as promised. “Trust but Verify” indeed.

Given this situation, how long will it be before those with whom the United States is negotiating start demanding intrusive verification procedures or other guarantees designed to ensure that America doesn’t sign a deal and then tear it up a year later or demand that it be renegotiated? How long before other important states decide they cannot base their foreign-policy decisions on expectations or assurances from the United States because Washington simply cannot be trusted to do what they say. 

There are already worrisome signs of precisely this sort of trend. According to the Pew Research Center, the number of people who trust U.S. leadership has dropped from an average of 64 percent at the end of the Obama administration to roughly 22 percent during Trump’s first year in office. Even more remarkably, a larger percent of people around the world have confidence that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin will “do the right thing in world affairs” than the current U.S. president. When you’re trailing those two ruthless operators, it’s time to start asking why nobody trusts you.

To be sure, this is not to say that nobody trusts anyone from the United States anymore. U.S. business leaders continue to strike mutually beneficial deals with foreign counterparts; the beleaguered and understaffed diplomatic service continues to forge cooperative arrangements all over the world; U.S. intelligence agencies continue to collaborate with foreign countries under the protective umbrella of mutual confidence; and countless military-to-military engagements take place every day on a basis of mutual respect and regard. Indeed, given the time, money, attention, and lives that the United States has expended to reassure others about its credibility, it would be odd if other states had no confidence in Washington at all. It would be a vast overstatement, therefore, to conclude that past U.S. opportunism or the unreliable character of Trump had led others to conclude that the United States as a whole was totally unreliable.

Nonetheless, acquiring a reputation for being untrustworthy is costly. When trust disappears, reaching cooperative agreements inevitably will troops in South Korea because it doesn’t trust the North, and North Korea went to enormous lengths to build a nuclear bomb because it doesn’t trust the United States

Read more at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/10/america-cant-be-trusted-anymore/

The US needs a new foreign policy

The wreckage of the pandemic surrounds us—with more than half a million people around the world dead, the ranks of the global hungry doubling, and the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression raging. Well before the coronavirus hit, however, the liberal international order built and led by the United States was becoming less liberal, less ordered, and less American. The pandemic has accelerated that trend and aggravated preexisting conditions.

With the United States and its allies reeling, distracted, and divided by the pandemic, China’s ambition to become the dominant player in Asia has grown, as has its desire to reshape international institutions and rules to suit its power and preferences. The pandemic has also magnified the insecurities of Chinese leadership, amplifying their worries about economic sluggishness and social discontent. The result is greater domestic repression and an even more pugnacious brand of “wolf warrior” diplomacy.

Always attuned to the weakness of others, Vladimir Putin is losing sight of Russia’s own weakness. The collapse of the oil market and Putin’s mismanagement of the pandemic have made Russia’s one-dimensional economy and stagnant political system even more brittle. A potent counterpuncher, Putin still sees plenty of opportunities to disrupt and subvert rival countries, the kind of tactics that can help a declining power sustain its status. His margin for error, however, is shrinking.

Europe is caught between an assertive China, a revisionist Russia, an erratic America, and its own political breakdowns—none more perplexing than Brexit. The drift in the transatlantic alliance is worsening, with the U.S. looking for Europe to do more with less say, and Europe fearing that it will become the grass on which the great-power elephants trample.

The pandemic has also intensified the Middle East’s disorder and dysfunction. Hard-liners in both Tehran and Washington pose combatively at the foot of a dangerous escalatory ladder. Proxy wars in Yemen and Libya spin on. Syria remains a bloody wreck, and Israel’s impending annexation in the West Bank threatens to bury a two-state solution.

As the pandemic’s wave crests over developing countries, the world’s most fragile societies will only become more vulnerable. Latin America now faces the biggest economic decline in the region’s history. Africa, with its growing cities and daunting food, water, and health insecurities, faces greater risks than perhaps any other part of the world.

All of these challenges and uncertainties are further complicated by ongoing technological disruptions, and by ideological and economic competition.

The pace of change has outstripped the capacity of faltering, inward-looking leaders to shape the rules of the road. False information spreads with the same alacrity as truth; infectious diseases move faster than cures. The same technologies that unlock so many human possibilities are now being used by authoritarian leaders to lock in citizens, surveil them, and repress them.

With the triumphalism of globalization long behind us, societies struggle with widening inequality and mercantilist impulses. Democracy has been in retreat for more than a decade, the compact between citizens and governments badly frayed. International institutions are beginning to break—paralyzed by too much bureaucracy, too little investment, and intense major-power rivalry. Looming above it all is the forbidding menace of climate change, as our planet gradually suffocates on carbon emissions.

This moment screams for leadership to help forge a sense of order—an organizer to help navigate this complicated mess of challenges, stabilize geopolitical competition, and ensure at least some modest protections of global public goods.

But now we are living through the worst intersection of man and moment in American history. “America First” really means Trump first, America alone, and Americans on their own.

The post-pandemic future of the United States is not preordained. We still get a vote, and we still get to make some fateful choices. They are more complicated than those we faced at the end of the Cold War, when our undisputed primacy cushioned us from our mistakes and sustained our illusions. But today’s choices are even more consequential than those of 30 years ago.

The United States must choose from three broad strategic approaches: retrenchment, restoration, and reinvention. Each aspires to deliver on our interests and protect our values; where they differ is in their assessment of American priorities and influence, and of the threats we face. Each is easy to caricature—and each deserves an honest look.

Retrenchment

It’s not hard to persuade many Americans—struggling through the human and economic costs of the pandemic, pained by the open wounds of our racial divides, and doubtful about the power and promise of the American idea—to pull up our national drawbridges and retrench. Nor is it hard to make the case that the prevailing bipartisan foreign-policy consensus fumbled America’s post–Cold War “unipolar moment”—leaving the U.S. overstretched overseas and underinvested at home.

Proponents of retrenchment argue that for too long, friends and foes alike were glad to let the United States underwrite global security 

The U.S. may be first among unequals for now, but the notion that its leaders can resurrect the era of uncontested American primacy, prevent China’s rise, or will our diplomatic relationships and tools into exactly their pre-Trump, pre-pandemic shapes is a mirage.

Retrenchment is easily distorted as a kind of nativist isolationism or pathological declinism. It is often portrayed as a Bannonite call to throw overboard a sense of enlightened self-interest, and focus at long last on the “self” part. The heart of the argument is far less radical; it’s about narrowing our concept of vital interests, sharply reducing global military deployments, shedding outdated alliances, and reining in our missionary zeal for democracy-building abroad. Retrenchment means jettisoning our arrogant dismissiveness of nationalism and sovereignty, and understanding that other powers will continue to pursue spheres of influence and defend them. And it means acknowledging that the U.S. can manage threats and adversaries more effectively than it can vanquish them.

The main risk in retrenchment lies in taking it too far, or too fast. Any effort to disentangle the United States from the world comes with complicated downsides. President Barack Obama’s attempt to shift the terms of American engagement in the Middle East offers an important caution. His thoughtful long game met the unsynchronized passions of the region’s short game, creating significant dislocations and doubts about American power.

There are bigger structural questions too. Even if the U.S. accepted its relative decline and shrank its external ambitions, where’s the rising ally to whom America can pass the baton, as the British did to the U.S. after World War II? However sclerotic some of our alliances have become, how confident are American leaders that they can shape our fate better without them? Isn’t there a danger of the United States becoming an island power in a world inhospitable to islands—with China gradually dominating the Eurasian landmass, Russia a weakening accomplice, and Europe an isolated appendage?

And would an America retrenching in hard power still be able to play the organizing role on issues like climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, and global trade, which no other country can play right now?

Restoration

A case can be made that American diffidence, not hubris, is the original sin. Warts and all, U.S. global leadership ushered in an era of unprecedented peace and prosperity. We give it up at our peril. Retrenchers subscribe to the diplomat George Kennan’s view that the sooner the U.S. sheds its paternalistic altruism and becomes just another big country, the better off it will be. Restorationists believe that consigning America to such a role, in an otherwise rudderless world, would be a fatal mistake.

They argue that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. failed to take full advantage of its primacy. American leaders naively enabled the rise of our future rivals, thinking they’d be satisfied with a seat at our table, rather than displacing us at its head. The U.S. slowed NATO’s expansion to pacify Russian anxieties, only to see an ever more revanchist Russia get back on its feet, and welcomed China into the World Trade Organization as a “responsible stakeholder,” yet failed to hold it to account when it continued to behave irresponsibly, breaking the rules while the American middle class broke its back.

Restorationists argue that America suffers most not when it does too much, but tries too little. They believe that U.S. leaders feared the uncertain slippery slope of intervention abroad far more than the certain waves of human tragedy that would flow absent American action. They see “leading from behind” as an oxymoron and think the U.S. failed to appreciate how much emerging democracies depended on America, and how methodically authoritarians would contest the democratic model.

Although the United States may no longer enjoy unrivaled dominance, power differentials still lean significantly in our favor. Despite our self-inflicted wounds, we still have the world’s strongest military, most influential economy, most expansive alliance system, and most potent soft power.

Restorationists worry about the risk of overreaction to relative American decline. The contest with China is not another Cold War to avoid, but one to fight with confidence and win. The U.S. should reject any return to a world of closed spheres of influence—and be clear-eyed about the rise of techno-authoritarianism, and push back hard with a new concert of democracies. And although we might need to rebalance our foreign-policy tools and avoid the excesses of the post-9/11 era, the risks of slashing our defense budgets and our global military posture outweigh the rewards.

For critics, Saturday Night Live’s “More Cowbell” sketch—admittedly not your standard foreign-policy analogy—embodies the restorationist view. To paraphrase the immortal words of the producer Bruce Dickinson: The world has a fever, and the only prescription is more U.S. leadership, however discordant and self-involved we can sometimes be, and however fatigued our bandmates might be with our prima donna act.

The promised cure, however, leaves many questions unanswered. Do the American people have the stomach and resources right now for a cosmic struggle with authoritarianism or 

There lies an alternative between breaking up the band and resigning ourselves to the perpetual din of the cowbell.

We live in a new reality: America can no longer dictate events as we sometimes believed we could. The Trump administration has done more damage to American values, image, and influence than any other in my lifetime. And our nation is more divided by political, racial, and economic tensions than it has been in generations. But even so, assuming we don’t keep digging the hole deeper for ourselves at home and abroad, we remain in a better position than any other major power to mobilize coalitions and navigate the geopolitical rapids of the 21st century.

We can’t afford to just put more-modest lipstick on an essentially restorationist strategy, or, alternatively, apply a bolder rhetorical gloss to retrenchment. We must reinvent the purpose and practice of American power, finding a balance between our ambition and our limitations.

First and foremost, American foreign policy must support domestic renewal. Smart foreign policy begins at home, with a strong democracy, society, and economy. But it has to end there too—with more and better jobs, greater security, a better environment, and a more inclusive, just, and resilient society.

The well-being of the American middle class ought to be the engine that drives our foreign policy. We’re long overdue for a historic course correction at home. We need to push for more inclusive economic growth—growth that narrows gaps in income and health. Our actions abroad must further that goal, rather than hamper it. Prioritizing the needs of American workers over the profits of corporate America is essential. Leaders must do a far better job of ensuring that trade and investment deals reflect those imperatives.

That doesn’t mean turning our back on trade or global economic integration, however. Supply chains in some sectors with national-security implications will require diversification and redundancy to make them sturdier, but policy makers shouldn’t disrupt global supply chains that benefit American consumers and fuel emerging markets. An improved economic approach might involve elements of industrial policy, focusing more government support on science, technology, education, and research. That ought to be complemented by reform of our broken immigration system.

A second major priority for a reinvented foreign policy involves grand global challenges—climate change, global health insecurity, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the revolution in technology. All of those problems directly affect the health, security, and prosperity of Americans. None of them can be solved by the United States on its own. All will require  cooperation.

Read more at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/14/united-states-needs-new-foreign-policy-pub-82295

EU-US Relations: Donald Trump is currently a bigger headache for Europe than Iran is - by Luke McGee,

This week's escalation in tensions between Iran and the US has exposed an uncomfortable reality for many of America's friends in Europe.

When US President Donald Trump called on the UK, Germany, France, Russia and China -- the other nations signatory to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, otherwise known as the Iran deal -- to join him in walking away from the JCPOA, he was asking his European allies to do far more than isolate Iran

The Iran deal, which was signed under the auspices of the European Union, is the single biggest foreign policy achievement in the EU's history.

It was the EU that drove efforts to get all of the significant parties to the table. In doing so, it not only encouraged Iran to engage with the West, but it crucially created a forum in which the EU could start to navigate what is now its chief aim in foreign policy."The EU's top priority is balanced relations between the big two: China and America," said Steven Blockmans, head of foreign affairs at the European Center for Policy Studies.

In 2020, another American president is arguably a far bigger disruptor to the old continent than, China, Iran or Russia. What a difference 72 years can make.

Read more at: Donald Trump is currently a bigger headache for Europe than Iran is - CNN

EU INTL.TRADE: EU needs to 'toughen up' on trade - by Urmas Paet

The European Union needs to step up its game to support the interests of EU businesses, to counteract the increasingly agressive China and the at times more self-centred United States.

Despite its size and wealth in the global context, the EU has not managed to play itself out as a strong global power. In order for the EU businesses to compete on a greater equal footing with companies from other countries the EU has to toughen up, reach a coherent foreign policy, harmonise its various foreign policy instruments and have stronger rules.

Currently, the EU is not ready to effectively face the significant changes in the world.

May it be a more forceful and aggressive China, Russia that raises security concerns or the increasingly isolationist United States. For instance, negotiations with China to open the Chinese market for European investments have been very slow.

And this example is only one of many where the EU has failed to use political power to achieve its economic goals and strengthen the position of its businesses.

To achieve its objectives, the EU must take use of all its foreign policy instruments.

Read more at: EU needs to 'toughen up' on trade

USA: Trump fires hawk John Bolton from his Cabinet

Donald Trump says he has fired US national security advisor John Bolton

Read more at:
https://www.euronews.com/2019/09/10/donald-trump-says-he-has-fired-us-national-security-advisor-john-bolton

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USA: Veteran and famous newsman Dan Rather Compares Trump to Flying Cow Manure

President Donald Trump’s constant use of media is overwhelming Americans, according to veteran newsman Dan Rather.

His advice? The people need to see Trump’s rhetoric for what it is: propaganda meant to misinform and wear them down.

During an interview with CNN’s Brian Stelter, while they were discussing the rise of right-wing extremism around the globe, Rather took a moment to lament on Trump’s successes and failures in the digital age, and how he’s used new tools to his advantage.

In spite of his strengths in using social media, the Trump administration is apparently oblivious to the fact that right-wing extremism is on the rise online. Stelter asked Rather, “can [the White House] effectively respond to this rising threat of extremism on the internet” if they’re unaware of how it actually works?

“The answer is, not very well,” Rather said, per reporting from Newsweek. He further acknowledged that Trump has a lot of media tools at his disposal.

“Look, we have to deal with reality. This is a whole new age. And the president has the strongest, the most powerful platform for propaganda that humans have ever had. No president has ever had this kind of reach — the combination of television, radio, the internet, social media, tweets.”

Among the many difficulties with Trump’s use of media is the fact that he constantly uses it to disseminate false information.

Note EU-Digest: Republicans should start withholding support from what many people see as an unstable and unreliable person in the White House, if they don't, it could also be the end of the Republican party as a viable entity within the US political establishment.


Read more: Dan Rather Compares Trump to Flying Cow Manure | HillReporter.com

US Foreign Policy: Jeb Bush: Trump's 'unilateralism' on foreign policy is 'really dangerous' - by RachelFrazin

 Former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush (R) says in a new interview that President Trump's "unilateralism" on trade issues and other foreign policy is "really dangerous."

Bush, who challenged Trump for the GOP presidential nomination in 2016 and has said he hopes a Republican primary opponent emerges in 2020, spoke about some of his criticisms of Trump in a podcast interview with CNN's David Axelrod.

"We haven't had a major crisis to deal with, but this unilateralism or going-alone-ism I think is really dangerous," Bush said of Trump's foreign policy moves during the interview on CNN's "The Axe Files."

"Our friends no longer believe they can trust the United States and our enemies, in many cases, feel emboldened by this approach," he added. "I think it defies the ... bipartisan kind of consensus on foreign policy that has by-and-large kept America safe."

Read more: Jeb Bush: Trump's 'unilateralism' on foreign policy is 'really dangerous'

EU - Military - Foreign Policy: German Chancellor Angela Merkel calls for greater military cooperation in EU countries ahead of EU parliamentary elections in May - by Alex Daniel

Up Yours Donald !

Angela Merkel has said the European Union should cooperate more in developing weapons systems in a bid to push back against a growing wave of euroscepticism before the European parliamentary elections in May.

In a speech to her Christian Democrats party (CDU) she said: “It is good that after several decades we want to develop a common defence policy ... We must develop weapons systems together.”

“We have very strict export rules, others have less strict rules ... But anyone who develops an airplane with us would also like to know whether they can sell the plane with us,” she said.

Merkel has repeatedly stressed the importance of Germany’s partnership with France, saying on her weekly podcast this week the friendship was “far from a given after centuries of military conflict between our countries”.

“We want to give an impulse to European unity,” Merkel said.

In November the German Chancellor went as far as to call for the creation of a European Army, stressing that such an effort would not mean an end to the US-led Nato.

Note EU Digest: Given the present political climate in the US, the EU can not forever rely on the NATO being there, and must get off Grandpa's knee to take some more independent decisions of their own, as it relates to their defence and foreign policies.

EU-Digest

Global Politics: America’s Anxiety of Influence – by Stephen Walt

David Ignatius at the Washington Post recently published an interesting column ruing the decline of U.S. “influence” in the Middle East. His central theme is that U.S. “disengagement” from the region is allowing local actors to chart their own courses, and that many of them are now making bad decisions.

In his view, the prospects for positive change in the region are receding and that we will all be worse off as a result.

It’s a thoughtful column and worth reading. It’s also a revealing one, because it rests on one of those unspoken assumptions that are articles of faith in the U.S. foreign-policy community. Specifically, it suggests that U.S. influence is always a good thing and that its diminution (whether by accident or by design) is something to mourn.

But if you’ve been paying attention to the results of U.S. policy over the past quarter-century—especially in the Middle East but also in some other places—that position may not be the hill you want to die defending.

Look, it’s easy to understand why American foreign-policy elites like having lots of “influence.” To some degree it’s unavoidable. The United States is still the 800-pound gorilla in the international system and other global actors will inevitably pay close attention to whatever Uncle Sam is doing. For foreign-policy practitioners, having lots of influence and being fully engaged is also a heady experience; it means foreign governments will take your calls, treat you with deference and respect when you visit, and sometimes they follow your advice (or at least pretend to). If you’re in the foreign-policy business, it’s a helluva a lot more gratifying to represent the United States than to be out there pitching on behalf of a small or weak country whose voice does not carry.

To be clear: I understand why our foreign-policy elites worry (constantly!) about declining U.S. influence, and I can even see how that might be a bad thing in some circumstances. But we ought to recognize that “influence” is insufficient by itself and in some cases is counterproductive. Excessive U.S. influence leaves us performing missions we don’t know how to do (such as creating workable political institutions in radically different societies), allows local actors to blame us for their own failings, fuels conspiracy theories at home and abroad, and distracts U.S. officials from other problems that they might actually know how to solve. In some regions—and the Middle East would be high on my list—less U.S. influence might be more. Given all the success we’ve had trying to manage that region, maybe we’d be better off letting somebody else try. They could hardly do worse.

Moving in that direction will require a major change in the mindset of the U.S. foreign-policy elite. For too long, its members believed the United States was in fact the “indispensable nation,” and that the solution to all (or at least most) global problems had to be made in Washington. Students of management are often taught that effective leadership also requires learning how to delegate responsibility, because no single person has the power, knowledge, and wisdom to do everything. What is true for individual leaders is true for leading nations: learning how to offload problems onto others is in fact a consummate strategic skill. As long as Americans view influence as an inherent end, and as a resource to be hoarded like gold, we’re going to find ourselves overcommitted and be much less effective than we could be. As President Harry Truman supposedly said, “it’s amazing what you can accomplish if you don’t care who gets credit.”

Henceforth, Americans should worry rather less about the level of influence their country enjoys—and, relax, it will continue to dwarf that of most other countries—and worry a lot more about how that influence is being used. And guess what? If U.S. officials did a better job of selecting the right goals and actually achieving them, they would quickly find their influence growing; then, the number of problems they would then have deal with might shrink, instead of growing like kudzu or crabgrass in the warm summer sun.

Read the full report: America’s Anxiety of Influence – Foreign Policy

USA: The end of America's leaderless foreign policy - by Hal Brands

Independent counsel Robert Mueller has indicted 13 Russians for waging information warfare against the United States by tampering with the American electoral process in 2016. Sadly but predictably, America’s commander-in-chief did not respond by rallying his country to meet the threat. Rather, President Donald Trump went out of his way to dodge the question of Russian interference, while publicly attacking the officials and institutions that have had the temerity to confront that issue head-on.

Observers from both sides of the political spectrum, appropriately, deplored Trump’s abdication of his duty to defend the nation. Yet this episode also has a broader significance: It gives the lie to the idea that the U.S. can have a constructive foreign policy while a profoundly destructive individual is president.

This idea has commanded a respectable following since Trump took office. The fact that Trump appointed mostly mainstream figures to key positions, and that his “America first” agenda has been considerably watered down in practice, has led a number of Republican policy hands to argue that the administration’s actions have been broadly praiseworthy even if the president’s rhetoric has not. Elliott Abrams, who worked for Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, has argued that Trump has adopted a “fairly familiar Republican approach to foreign policy.” Matthew Kroenig, who advised the Mitt Romney and Marco Rubio presidential campaigns, contends that the administration has “the right people” and “the right positions.”

As I point out in my new book, “American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump,” these arguments are not entirely wrong. Despite his campaign promises, Trump has not (yet) launched an all-out trade war with China, torn up U.S. alliances, or quit the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization. In these and other cases, his advisers have persuaded him to take a more moderate course.

Even with respect to Russia, a similar pattern has prevailed. Trump continues to talk up the dangerous fantasy of a rapprochement with Putin, yet his administration has increased funding for forward defense in Eastern Europe, resolved to provide lethal weaponry to Ukraine, and pursued other policies that Russia hawks should welcome.

It is thus true that there are pockets of normality in U.S. policy, even in the age of Trump. What this most recent manifestation of Trump’s bizarre stance toward Russia demonstrates, though, is that there is only so much containing, circumventing and moderating of a president who refuses to take his duties seriously.

It is important to stipulate here that we don’t know precisely why Trump is so reflexively dismissive of the mountains of concrete evidence documenting a deliberate Russian campaign to suborn American democracy. It could be that Moscow possess some compromising information on him or his prior business dealings. It could be that he genuinely believes he is a diplomatic genius who can strike a grand bargain with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It could be that Trump perceives any discussion of Russian electoral interference as an assault on his presidential legitimacy, and that he is simply too narcissistic to separate that issue from the broader national wellbeing.

Whatever the answer, Trump’s refusal to personally take on the information-warfare threat from the Kremlin is crippling U.S. policy in several ways.

First, it is discouraging concrete — and badly needed — responses to the threat. If, as seems likely, there are covert efforts that the intelligence community might undertake either to strengthen U.S. defenses or retaliate against Russian attacks, they would likely require additional legal authorities or presidential findings — neither of which this president is likely to support.

In the same vein, European officials have privately advocated greater trans-Atlantic cooperation to address the common danger posed by Russian meddling, but Trump’s indifference to that danger has limited the possibilities for such collaboration. Within the U.S. government, too, Trump’s attitude is raising the political costs and risks for advisers who seek to counter Russian measures. It is hardly surprising, then, that the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies have made so little progress in hardening American defenses, even as intelligence officials have warned in increasingly dire tones that the Russians will seek to re-run the 2016 playbook in 2018. In the American system, decisive action generally requires presidential buy-in, and that has been sorely lacking.

Second, Trump is making it impossible for the U.S. to issue clear and believable deterrent threats. Information warfare and cyberattacks are inherently difficult to prevent, and so a better approach may be to go on the offensive, by threatening sharp retaliation through reciprocal cyberattacks or other measures. But such threats only work if they are seen to be credible, and why would anyone believe that Washington would inflict significant costs on Russia — and risk significant escalation of bilateral tensions — when Trump declines even to acknowledge that a threat exists?

Third, the president’s position is not just having pernicious effects within the executive branch; it is undercutting the broader national will and consensus needed to meet a grave security challenge. The genius of the Russian meddling in 2016 was that it avoided the normal “rally around the flag” effect that often occurs in the wake of a foreign attack. Instead, it pitted Americans against one another — Republicans against Democrats, state authorities against the federal government.

Another president would surely see it as his or her duty to surmount such divisions by issuing a broad, nonpartisan call to arms. Yet Trump is aggressively politicizing the issue, impugning the reputations of the agencies that are striving to defend U.S. democracy, and thus making it far less likely that the country will achieve unity in the face of danger.

Finally, Trump’s performance is reminding us of the critical role the American president plays in leading not just his own country but the larger “free world,” and how powerfully the absence of that leadership is felt at times of crisis. The liberal international order America has anchored for generations is facing an array of challenges from authoritarian, revisionist powers, namely Russia and China. Yet rather than placing himself at the vanguard of the international response, Trump is shirking that obligation. And in doing so, he is exacerbating the demoralization and division that is weakening the liberal West just as the dangers are mounting.

To borrow from former French President Jacques Chirac, the position of leader of the free world is indeed vacant today — no matter how hard Trump’s advisers labor to make it seem otherwise.

Read more: The end of America's leaderless foreign policy | The Japan Times

EU-US Relations: Will the EU-US relationship ever be the same again? by Rolf Mützenich

On 9 November 2016, the unthinkable happened: Donald Trump was elected 45th President of the United States of America. Since then the US has not only lived up to the worst anti-American clichés touted by the extremes of Left and Right – it has surpassed them. A year of ‘America First’ has put a serious strain on ties between the US and its European allies. But is the relationship really in crisis?

Let’s start with the positives. The US president may have offended numerous heads of state and government, but he hasn’t (yet) provoked a war. At home, Trump has only managed to push two major projects through Congress: a long-anticipated tax overhaul and the appointment of the conservative Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court.

Otherwise, it seems America’s famed system of ‘checks and balances’ is still functioning pretty well – especially when compared with the creeping authoritarianism we see in some EU member states such as Hungary and Poland. It’s no Russia or China either.

Following Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, a number of US states created a ‘Climate Alliance’ committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Several American cities are offering refuge and support to immigrants from Latin America facing deportation. US courts have blocked plans preventing transsexuals from joining the military, and knocked down three attempts to ban Muslims from certain countries from entering the US. (The Supreme Court has since reinstated the ban.)
 
Trump’s efforts to do away with ex-president Barack Obama’s healthcare reforms have failed. Plans to build a wall along the Mexican border have also come to nothing. Encouragingly, the US Department of Justice appointed Robert Mueller to oversee an FBI investigation into the president’s Russian connections and those of his entourage. So despite countless presidential tweets attacking the system, the separation of powers is still working.

A joint European security and defence policy is long overdue, and PESCO is just the latest in a long list of initiatives and experiments. As we have seen, Europe is highly inefficient when it comes to defence spending. Much work is needlessly repeated: the EU has 17 types of tank, 29 types of frigates and destroyers, and 20 types of fighter jets. Procedures for joint missions are complex, the financing arrangements risky.

PESCO is a first step in the right direction. It doesn’t herald the ‘mega-army’ some have predicted. Rather it puts forward an ambitious aim of cooperating intelligently and boosting military capabilities by avoiding unnecessary duplication and using limited resources more effectively.

This includes the establishment of a joint European Defence Fund (EDF) of €500 million; the European Defence Agency, founded in 2004; and the creation of smaller EU battlegroups (military units) to respond to and prevent crises. If successful, PESCO will represent a first step towards greater European independence in the area of security policy.

We should also take care to ensure justified criticism of Trump does not lead to defeatism, cynicism, self-righteousness or anti-Americanism. European countries have no other option but to continue working with the Trump administration as best they can, whilst seeking to maintain contact with Congress and work with American politicians who take an interest in Europe, as well as with NGOs and think tanks.

We must do everything in our power to ensure that not only is there life after Donald Trump, but that the project of the ‘West’ still exists. It is also important that the EU, when there is disagreement, stands in unity against Britain and America, the former leading powers on each side of the Atlantic.

We need both: more Europe and more democracy on the one hand, and the preservation of transatlantic foundations for the post-Trump era on the other. Democracies must respond to the advance of authoritarian structures and individuals by democratising their security policy, because democracy and peace are inextricably linked.

We must observe and enforce rules and standards, and we need credible sanctions against those who break them. We need to expand international (criminal) jurisdiction and to strengthen international organisations and the rights of national parliaments and civil society at home and abroad. If Europe is to overcome the significant challenges facing our world, it must involve the authoritarian superpowers of China and Russia.

However, that cannot replace a newly-aligned transatlantic partnership, where Europe and the US stand on an equal footing. Trump is not America and he will not be in power forever. The goal must be to ensure that the next American president does not take office with the western world in ruins.

Read more: Will the EU-US relationship ever be the same again? | International Politics and Society - IPS

USA - Building a Wall Around America - the Isolationist Trump Doctrine and Strategy as unveiled by Donald Trump

A wall around America, instead 
of one between Mexico and US

President Donald Trump declared a new national security strategy on Monday,December 18, stressing the "America first" message of his 2016 campaign and faulting previous U.S. leaders for failing to measure up to it and look out for the nation's citizens. Isolation

"Our leaders engaged in nation building abroad while they failed to build up and replenish our nation at home," he said, pointing to the economy's strong performance and predicting even better under his policies.

His security strategy envisions nations in constant competition, reverses Obama-era warnings on climate change and affirms that the United States will unilaterally defend its sovereignty, even if that means risking existing the agreements with other countries that have dominated the United States' foreign policy since the Cold War.

The strategy from the Republican president could sharply alter U.S. international relationships if fully implemented. It focuses on four main themes: protecting the homeland, promoting American prosperity, demonstrating peace through strength and advancing American influence in an ever-competitive world.

Trump's doctrine holds that nation-states are in perpetual competition and that the U.S. must fight on all fronts to protect and defend its sovereignty from friend and foe alike. While the administration often says that "America First" does not mean "America Alone," the national security strategy makes clear that the United States will stand up for itself even if that means acting unilaterally or alienating others on issues such as trade, climate change and immigration.

Despite the risk of potential isolation presented by Trump's strategy, its fundamentals are not a surprise. The strategy emphasizes that U.S. economic security is national security. And it stresses that the U.S. is interested only in relationships with other countries, including in alliances such as NATO, that are fair and reciprocal.

The strategy also details the threats of "rogue regimes," like North Korea. It says that China and Russia "challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity."

Despite international challenges, the document cites emerging opportunities to advance American interests in the Middle East. "Some of our partners are working together to reject radical ideologies and key leaders are calling for a rejection of Islamist extremism and violence," it says. "Encouraging political stability and sustainable prosperity would contribute to dampening the conditions that fuel sectarian grievances."

Note EU-Digest: Obviously the President of the USA can and must do what in his eyes he believes is good for America. As to the EU, what is good for America, necessarily does not have to be good for the EU. Consequently, as has been written many times, the EU must stop being the "lapdog" of America, given its importance as a world class economy, with a population of close to half a billion people, and establish its own independent foreign policy based on EU principles and  priorities, and include a review of its military objectives within this context.

As to the leaders of European Populists and Nationalist parties, like Geert Wilders, Jean Marie Lr Pen, Nigel Farage, and others, who apparently admire Trump's "America First Isolationist Doctrine",  we  recommend they pack their bags and request asylum in the US  from their idol Donald Trump.   

Read more: Trump unveils details of 'America First' security strategy

Europeans think they know America – but the gun control debate shows how little we do - OpEd by Suzanne Moore

The need for using guns is spoon fed into most American kids 

When I first went to my friend Sherry’s house for dinner, I couldn’t help noticing tiny holes all over the white kitchen cupboards. She was a new friend, my only friend, actually, as I had just moved to Miami.

Her mother came in and saw me looking and said: “That’s where Shane shot himself up.” Shane was Sherry’s cousin. Her mother was mostly annoyed that he had used Sherry’s dad’s gun. Whether this was an accident or a suicide I was too polite to ask. He was 16.

When Sherry’s dad sat down at the table, he showed me his huge collection of guns. One rifle after another. I sat there nodding, wondering what to say.

The American dream was what my father had offered my mother. Escape from small-town Suffolk to a place of Pontiacs and huge fridges. She liked Americans so much she married two of them, with an English man in between. “He bought me a lovely little handbag pistol,” she said of my father. This was as glamorous to her as the menthols she smoked: a special ladies’ gun.

This casual relationship to gun ownership is different in different parts of the US. For the US is several different countries. When, later in the 80s, I moved to New York, gun violence was seen as a black crime.

I had moved to the US because it seemed to offer everything I already knew and more. But very quickly I knew that this was an extremely alien culture. It is an illusion of popular culture that makes us think it isn’t. Somehow, though,  Europeans still think they “know” America because they once had brunch in Manhattan. Americans are just like us but with bigger portions, some still say. We can prescribe our liberal solutions to their terrible problems if they would only listen.

This is delusional. The unknowability of the US, even to itself, has been brought into focus by Donald Trump’s election. Nowhere is it more apparent than in the debate around gun control. An angry white man is in the White House. And angry white men who murder scores of people with guns are not terrorists, apparently.

The reaction to these massacres is that more people go out and buy guns to protect themselves. This mentality is incomprehensible to many of us. Never mind North Korea, Americans excel at killing each other with guns and opioids. The terror that they fear is coming over some mythical wall is in fact rooted inside their own culture.

The same figures are rehearsed after every massacre. It is estimated that the US has the highest number of privately owned guns in the world – in 2012, there were thought to be about 300m, held by about one-third of the population (enough for every man, woman and child in the country to have a gun). The second-ranked country is Yemen. In the US, 18 young people are killed every day by guns. Meanwhile, suicide – the majority by gun – is the second most common cause of death for Americans between 15 and 34.

One of the saddest parts of Gary Younge’s devastating book Another Day in the Death of America is when parents of children gunned down speak of relief. The mother of Tyshon Anderson, who was shot in a gang-related incident at 18, says: “I don’t have to worry about him being out there killing nobody else or nobody else trying to kill him.”

Every right-minded liberal can point to Australia, where gun control has brought the homicide rate right down. Legislation would implement background checks for gun ownership and yet …
Gun fairs are visited as if by Victorian anthropologists. Who are these people? The National Rifle Association is powerful, and, of course, the militias were out recently in Charlottesville. This is not “left-behind” America, but it is a part we find utterly foreign.

The anti-centralised state narrative may be wrapped in second-amendment bluster, but part of the problem with gun control is precisely this word “control”. Obamacare is rejected again as something to do with control. I offer no solution to the massacres. I don’t particularly like the US’s reliance on cars either, but I can’t see the country without them.

The now-familiar argument in the US on gun control is that of two different nations circling each other. It seems to me much of the US cannot be understood as a developed nation. Look at the levels of inequality, the infant mortality rates, the addiction, the self-inflicted wounds. The absolute rejection of a centralised state is part of its notion of freedom. That this culture is not ours, that it is something entirely different, gets brought home time and again.

When I was being taught to shoot by an American ex-cop, he emphasised that children must learn how to behave around guns. At what age, I asked him, did he think they should have their first gun?

“Three” he said.

Note EU-Digest: Let us also not forget that the US has coined the phrase "collateral damage" when they carpet bomb thousands of innocent civilians to their death in areas of conflict, they have basically created themselves in the name of "democracy" .

EU-Digest

Canada: What does Canada get out of restoring diplomatic ties with Iran? (and opposing Trump policies)

Justin Trudeau and Hassan Roubani
believe in open and frank dialogue

It's been almost two years since Iran began to emerge from its international isolation after signing a deal with world powers to ensure its nuclear program is "peaceful." It's been almost as long since Justin Trudeau was elected prime minister on a platform that included restoring diplomatic ties with the country.

Last week, we learned Canadian officials are in Tehran for the first time since the previous Conservative government broke off relations with Iran nearly five years ago.

Since coming to power, the Liberals have been careful to remain critical of Iran's human rights violations, and have  reiterated Canada's opposition to its support for listed terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah.

But Canada has also suggested engaging with Iran may change its behaviour, including on human rights and Iran's habit of jailing and abusing Canadian citizens and residents.

"We believe that open and frank dialogue, especially when we disagree, is the best way to effectively address security issues, hold Iran to account on human rights and advance consular cases," Alex Lawrence, a spokesperson for Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland told CBC.

Western nations, including Canada, have been engaging or trying to engage with Iran since 2015.

Note EU-Digest: It is interesting to note that Canada, as is also the case for most EU Countries, is not in-line at all with the thinking of the Trump Administration.  In particular as it relates to their views on foreign policy (specifically Iran), global warming and the handling of Middle East "crises management".  

EU-Digest

Migrants and Immigrants: Who Builds Higher Walls? – Comparing EU and US Restrictive Migration Policies

It's not their problem they are at the border - it is ours

Two months into Donald Trump’s presidency, Washington has unleashed radical measures to prevent migrants and refugees from entering the United States. He temporarily banned citizens from seven predominantly Muslim countries from travelling to the US, suspended the US refugee resettlement program for Syrian refugees and the arrival of all refugees. He also ordered to build his long-promised wall on the US-Mexican border purportedly designed to stem the flow of irregular migrants from the south.

The European Union was very quick to condemn the measures while also forgetting that some of its own members had also resorted to illiberal and restrictive measures to control immigration and the influx of migrants. In Europe, just as in the United States, rightist populist groups are scapegoating migrants and refugees for every problem in the society. The continent is already mired in populism and hate speech against migrants, and particularly against the Muslims. The toxic climate and attacks are on the rise. If the current trend goes on, Europe may actually easily end up following Washington’s anti-immigration line.

Yet, the United States, unlike most of the European Union, has a long tradition in migration and immigration policy. While these moves of the White House might be just an aberration in the world’s most successful immigration society, which is actually better positioned to control who comes in, in Europe, xenophobia and Islamophobia pose a greater risk.

Many Europeans do see immigration from predominantly Muslim countries as particularly problematic. According to a recent Chatham House research study conducted in ten EU countries, about 55 percent of respondents agreed that all such immigration should be stopped, 20 percent disagreed, and 25 percent were undecided. Therefore, Islamophobia and xenophobia could easily destabilize societies that already have large, insufficiently integrated minority communities. They could also easily hamper efforts to stabilize Europe’s turbulent neighborhood.

European leaders need to acknowledge that unlike the United States or Canada, European societies do not have much experience and thus are not naturally inclined to facilitate immigration. To make it a success will require a lot more active governmental involvement, in particular massive investment in education. It will also mean revising long-established practices designed to protect the interests of existing stakeholders and implementing structural reforms that are indispensable for successfully integrating large numbers of of immigrants.

Note EU-Digest Migrants and Immigrants have been streaming into the EU not because they wanted to, but because we destroyed their homes, after we were dragged into military adventures in Afghanistan and the Middle East by our American "friends", which cost EU member states heaps of money and can not be called successful

The EU needs a fresh new independent foreign policy,and its own military defense Force. 

Read more:Who Builds Higher Walls? – Comparing EU and US Restrictive Migration Policies | EuBulletin.Com

USA: National Solipsism - A complete tour of Donald Trump’s worldview, in a single garbled quote -by William Saleta

Nationalism, in Trump’s algorithm, means the absence of transnational values. In his case, it means disregard for conservative commitments to free trade and political liberty. He brags to the Bild and Times correspondents that when Jeb Bush said Trump was “not a conservative,” crowds at Trump’s rallies shouted, “Who cares?” Trump says he’s unbounded by ideology. “I’m really about making great deals for the people,” he says.

Any country that clings to transnational idealism is, in Trump’s view, a chump. The EU, for instance, claims to stand for economic cooperation, human rights, and democracy. Trump thinks that’s nonsense. “You look at the European Union, and it’s Germany,” he argues. “Basically a vehicle for Germany. That’s why I thought the U.K. was so smart in getting out.” Trump also wants Europe to stop welcoming refugees. “People don’t want to have other people coming in and destroying their country,” he says. He dismisses the recent migrants to Europe as “illegals.”

Trump holds out the idea that nationalism will be good for Europe. A nationalist America will cut a trade deal with a nationalist U.K., and so on. But if all we care about is cutting deals, it’s not clear why America would favor traditional allies over powerful dictators. One of the interviewers asks Trump: “Who would you trust more—Angela Merkel or Vladimir Putin?” Trump expresses no preference. “I start off trusting both,” he says.

Would Trump trade away Europe’s security for a deal with Putin? He sounds as though he would. In 2014, the EU imposed sanctions on Russia for invading Ukraine, which borders four EU member states. In the interview, Trump is asked whether he supports these sanctions. He replies: “Let’s see if we can make some good deals with Russia. … You do have sanctions, and Russia’s hurting very badly right now because of sanctions, but I think something can happen that a lot of people are gonna benefit.”

For complete report click here: A complete tour of Donald Trump’s worldview, in a single garbled quote.

Europe’s new “Indispensable Nations”- by Joschka Fischer

After the shock of the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States in 2016, this will be a decisive year for Europe. Upcoming parliamentary elections in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and possibly Italy will decide whether the European Union will hold together, or whether it will disintegrate under the neo-nationalist wave sweeping the West.

Meanwhile, the Brexit negotiations will begin in earnest, providing a glimpse of the future of the EU-UK relationship. And Trump’s inauguration on January 20 may someday be remembered as a watershed moment for Europe.

Judging by Trump’s past statements about Europe and its relationship with the US, the EU should be preparing for some profound shocks. The incoming US president, an exponent of the new nationalism, does not believe in European integration.

Here he has an ally in Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has long tried to destabilize the EU by supporting nationalist forces and movements in its member states. If the Trump administration supports or turns a blind eye to those efforts, the EU – sandwiched between Russian trolls and Breitbart News – will have to brace itself for challenging times indeed.

The consequences for the EU will be even more serious if, in addition to setting the US relationship with Russia on a new foundation, Trump continues to call into question America’s security guarantee for Europe. Such a move would be at the expense of NATO, which has institutionalized the US security umbrella for more than six decades. Europeans would suddenly find themselves standing alone against a Russia that has increasingly employed military means to challenge borders, such as in Ukraine, and to reassert its influence – or even hegemony – over Eastern Europe.

We will soon know what comes next for NATO, but much harm has already been done. Security guarantees are not just a matter of military hardware. The guarantor also must project a credible message that it is willing to defend its allies whenever necessary. Thus, such arrangements depend largely on psychology, and on a country’s trustworthiness vis-à-vis friends and foes alike. When that credibility is damaged, there is a growing risk of provocation – and, with it, the threat of escalation into larger crises, or even armed conflict.

Given this risk, the EU should now shore up what it has left with respect to NATO and focus on salvaging its own institutional, economic, and legal integration. But it should also look to its member states to provide a second security option.

The EU itself is based on soft power: it was not designed to guarantee European security, and it is not positioned in its current form to confront a hard-power challenge. This means that it will fall to its two largest and economically strongest countries, France and Germany, to bolster Europe’s defense. Other countries such as Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, and Poland will also have a role to play, but France and Germany are indispensable.

Of course, living in continental Europe means having Russia as a neighbor, and neighborly relations, generally speaking, should be based on peace, cooperation, and mutual respect (especially when one’s neighbor is a nuclear power). But Europeans cannot harbor any illusions about Russia’s intent. The Kremlin approaches foreign policy as a zero-sum game, which means that it will always prioritize military strength and geopolitical power over cooperative security arrangements.

Russia does not view weakness or the lack of a threat from its neighbors as a basis for peace, but rather as an invitation to extend its own sphere of influence. So, power asymmetry in Eastern Europe will lead only to instability. If Europe wants a stable, enduring peace, it first must ensure that it is taken seriously, which is clearly not the case today. Europe can credibly strengthen its security only if France and Germany work together toward the same goal, which they will have an opportunity to do after their elections this year.

EU diplomats used to murmur off the record that Germany and France would never see eye to eye on military and financial issues, owing to their different histories and cultures. But if security conditions take a turn for the worse, that may no longer be the case. Indeed, reaching a compromise on both sides of the Rhine should not be so difficult: France undoubtedly has the experience to lead on defense; and the same goes for Germany on financial matters.

If pursuing this European security option prompts the US to renew its own security guarantee, so much the better. Meanwhile, the EU should also forge a post-Brexit cooperative strategic arrangement with the UK, whose geopolitical position and security interests will remain unchanged.The old EU developed into an economic power because it was protected beneath the US security umbrella. But without this guarantee, it can address its current geopolitical realities only by developing its own capacity to project political and military power. Six decades after the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community, history and current developments are pushing France and Germany to shape Europe’s future once again.

Read more: Europe’s new “Indispensable Nations”

USA: Trump Tweets Gives A Glimpse Into Foreign Policy Approach

President-elect Donald Trump has used Twitter — his preferred means of communication — to weigh in on a swath of foreign policy issues over the past few weeks.

His comments give glimpse into how his incoming administration will deal with pressing foreign matters — but also highlight how reactionary comments on social media can immediately spur international concern and attention.

And his staff have indicated that taking to Twitter to air his concerns or, often, grievances, won't end once he enters the Oval Office.

Read more: Trump Tweets Gives A Glimpse Into Foreign Policy Approach

EU Defense Cooperation: Threat or Benefit for NATO? - by Markus Heinrich

Has the time come for the EU to say "bye-bye NATO" ?

Britain has always been a somewhat half-hearted member of the EU. The country has been reluctant to hand over competences to Brussels and principally opposed to “ever closer union” — even as it was eager to widen the EU’s membership.

As a reluctant (and soon to be ex) participant in European integration, the British worldview has been, and continues to be, Atlanticist rather than European.

As a firmly Altanticist nation, Britain has been vehemently opposed to any EU military structures. It deemed NATO as the one and only framework for providing security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

But with Britain set to leave the EU some time in 2019 – based on Theresa May’s announcement that Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty will be triggered in March 2017 and the assumption that a successful exit is negotiated within the two-year time limit – a major obstacle to EU defense cooperation will be removed in the foreseeable future.

Negotiating Brexit will be a difficult and complex process that will occupy politicians and diplomats on both sides of the English Channel for some time. Even so, there are signs that the EU is determined that this will not prevent its defense agenda from progressing.

France and Germany have been leading calls for enhanced European defense cooperation (such as a permanent EU military headquarters and the sharing of military assets).

The Franco-German proposals were outlined by French defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his German counterpart Ursula von der Leyen in September 2016.

Von der Leyen called for a European defense union – initially comprised of a core group, but open to all EU members – comparing it to a “Schengen of defense.”

The recent EU summit in Bratislava – at which Britain was not represented – saw Franco-German proposals for defense cooperation generally well received by member states. The plan is therefore not just a Franco-German objective, but is likely to enjoy wider support in a 28-1 member EU.

A concrete example of how European defense collaboration could benefit from Brexit is the European Defence Agency (EDA).

The EDA was established in 2004 to “support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defense capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future.” Its three main missions are to:

1. Support the development of European defense capabilities and military cooperation

2. Stimulate defense research and technology to strengthen Europe’s defense industry

3. Act as a military interface to EU policies

An increase in the EDA’s meager budget has been vetoed in the past by Britain. With its veto gone post Brexit – and given the generally positive reception of the Franco-German proposals at the Bratislava summit – a future budget increase for the EDA is a distinct possibility. 


Read more: EU Defense Cooperation: Threat or Benefit for NATO? - The Globalist

EU: It is high time we stand up for our Europe - "united we stand but divided we will fall"

Our Europe is in danger.

Nationalism, xenophobia and insularity threaten its fundamental values.

Our Europe, the most impressive political construction of modern times, cannot stand by as national governments jeopardise its democratic, economic, social, cultural and environmental model.

They have shown inertia and distrust when faced first with economic crisis, then with refugees and most recently with terrorism. Each successive threat has been worsened by a lack of cooperation and coordination between European governments.

The time has surely come for Europe’s citizens to make our voices heard, to express our desire for ever stronger unity and solidarity, for deeper political union.

Europe is not the cause of our problems, but the solution. For too long, our fate has sat in the hands of national and foreign leaders and partially discredited European institutions.

Once a symbol of peace, openness and solidarity, Europe has become synonymous with insularity, exclusion and self-absorption. And where Europeans are increasingly struggling to see their values reflected.

Let us not consign ourselves to helplessness, to a lack of confidence, to doubts and fears, to images of refugees dying at our borders because of a lack of solidarity from member states and because our leaders do not have the courage to do the right thing.

It is now urgent for us to move beyond the strictly national arena and to construct a truly European political foundation to take on the challenges of globalisation, modernity and a revived democracy through the direct elections of EU leaders and a progressive independent foreign policy which is not tied to any destructive foreign nation's policy.

Our sense of belonging to a European people, to a community of values, is too often thwarted by our inability to translate this desire into politics.  We need to continuously send messages to our political leaders, stating that Europe is our nation and that it can have no future without political union and the construction of a firm shell around a united European state with its own foreign policy.

“If we cannot dream of a better Europe, we will never construct a better Europe” Václav Havel, former President of the Czech Republic once said.. Let us show our desire for Europe to step forward.

Let us fly Europe’s flag – our flag – on our social network profiles, our web pages, our houses, our cars and bikes, everywhere!

This call is supported, among others, by VOXEurope, Fabien Cazenave, Pietro De Matteis (Federalist Party), Bernard Guetta (France Inter), Eric Jozsef (Libération), Ovidiu Nahoi (Dilema Veche, RFI Romania), Wojciech Przybylski (Eurozine), José Ignacio Torreblanca (El País), Anne Tréca, Nicolas Vadot (Le Vif), Francesco Belluscio, Mario Benvenuto, Esther Cordero, Luca Feltrin, Sabrina Paglierani, Davide Pozzo, EU-Digest

EU-Digest