Russia: Bread and Autocracy in Putin’s Russia

Food has been crucial to the survival of regimes since the emergence of early states. Yet despite its significance, until recently food availability was rarely discussed as a principal political issue outside the global South. This essay centers on the political role of food in Putin’s Russia and the Kremlin’s long­­­­­­standing goal of establishing nutritional autarky that would insulate the regime from dependence on food imports. We present the origins of Putin’s food policies, their ideological basis and the forms that they have taken since early 2000s. We also discuss Russia’s use of food as a weapon during the 2022 war in Ukraine.

Read More at: Bread and Autocracy in Putin’s Russia | Journal of Democracy

EU-Britain Relations: How a ‘Global Britain’ Could Cope With the Brexit Consequences - by Ben Judah, Georgina Wright

Over the past four years, as the United Kingdom has wrestled with the consequences of its narrow vote to leave the European Union, there has been little to no broader foreign policy debate in the country. Instead, Britons seem to have become caught between three temperaments. There are the catastrophists, who argue the U.K. has become completely irrelevant on the international stage as a result of Brexit; the nostalgics, who see a powerful Britain through the lens of a great colonial power; and the denialists, who refuse to accept that Britain must adapt to a changing global context. All are characterized by a surfeit of emotion and deficit of strategy⎯and none have answers to the key questions their government must now answer.

Read more at: How a ‘Global Britain’ Could Cope With the Brexit Consequences

EU: 'For Europe to survive, its economy needs to survive': Angela Merkel interview in full

As the rotating presidency of the EU council passes to Germany on 1 July, the country’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, sat down for an interview with the Guardian and five other European newspapers – Germany’s Süddeutsche Zeitung, France’s Le Monde, Spain’s La Vanguardia, Italy’s La Stampa and Poland’s Polityka – to talk about Europe’s economic response to the coronavirus pandemic, her stance on the Brexit negotiations, and global challenges posed by the US, Russia and China.

Germany’s European council presidency is taking place during an unprecedented crisis. There is a lot of pressure; Germany is expected to sort things out. How nervous are you?

My first council presidency as chancellor was in 2007. The European constitutional treaty had just been rejected in France and the Netherlands, and we had set ourselves the task of shaping a new treaty. We succeeded in that. Then came the international financial crisis, turbulence for the euro and the refugee issue – so difficult times are nothing new. And time and again it has been shown that Europe is not yet sufficiently resistant to crises. In the euro crisis, we lacked the tools for an appropriate response. The movements of refugees in 2015 showed up the deficiencies of the EU asylum system.

Read more at: 
'For Europe to survive, its economy needs to survive': Angela Merkel interview in full | World news | The Guardian

USA - Democracy being challenged: Can U.S. Democracy Policy Survive Trump? - by Thomas Carothers

In President Donald Trump’s first year in office, U.S. policy relating to supporting democracy abroad became starkly divided. At the level of “high policy”—direct engagement and messaging by President Trump and his principal foreign policy advisers—the United States sharply downgraded its global pro-democratic posture. Trump’s praise of dictators, criticism of democratic allies, and anti-democratic actions at home recast the United States as at best an ambivalent actor on the global democratic stage. Yet at the same time, pro-democratic “low policy”—quiet but serious engagement by U.S. diplomats to counter democratic backsliding and support democratic advances overseas, and the extensive but generally low-profile domain of U.S. democracy assistance programs—largely carried on, making important contributions in many countries.

During Trump’s second year, this policy schism has only widened. He has doubled down on his embrace of dictators and spurning of democratic partners, as well as his anti-democratic actions at home. His new secretary of state and national security adviser may not share his anti-democratic impulses, but they have done little to mitigate his anti-democratic actions and have reinforced a transactional foreign policy with little apparent commitment to the idea of democracy as a universal value. Still, U.S. pro-democratic low policy carries on, as American diplomats support democracy in various countries at important moments of political change, and as democracy assistance remains at pre-Trump levels of activity. Yet the manifest lack of commitment to democracy at the top is increasingly corroding the low policy domain.

Under Trump, U.S. democracy high policy has reached its lowest ebb of at least the past forty years. If the United States continues its present course for two more years, it will end up stranded on the sidelines, or even on the wrong side, of the global democratic struggle, precisely at a time when that struggle is more acute than at any time in modern history. Nevertheless, democracy’s defenders—both inside and outside of the U.S. government—still have the opportunity to mitigate the damage.

Read more: Can U.S. Democracy Policy Survive Trump? - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Turkey: Erdogan has limited options to save (himself) and Turkey from the financial crisis - by Samia Nakhoul, Dominic Evans

Purge them all, including the economy

After 15 years in power as prime minister and president, Tayyip Erdogan faced down a weak opposition in June elections that swept away any checks and balances to the unchallenged rule he wanted. In Turkey he appears lord of all he surveys.

But his victory could become a poisoned chalice if he cannot resolve an angry feud with President Donald Trump that is pushing his country towards financial crisis.

Erdogan has limited options. Most involve a loss of face or a loss of sovereignty for which he alone would be blamed, having successfully marginalized not just a divided opposition but his own Justice and Development Party (AKP).

His victories in June were decisive. Re-elected as president under a new order modeled more on Vladimir Putin’s Russia than France or the United States, he also secured a parliamentary majority by allying with far-right nationalists.

The role of prime minister was abolished, leaving Erdogan to dominate not just the executive - appointing ministers, chairing the cabinet and replacing top civil servants with political appointees – but also holding sway over the judiciary and the legislature.

Having chosen to rule alone from his vast neo-Ottoman palace in Ankara, he confronts the spiraling crisis alone.

The lira has collapsed by 40 percent this year. Turkish banks that borrowed heavily abroad now face the near impossible task of refinancing short-term debt in expensive dollars and euros.

Bottom-line : the party could be over for President Erdogan very quickly, even violently, once the vast majority of his followers personally start feeling the economic pinch in their own pocket-books, which is now starting to happen at a rapid pace.

Read more: Erdogan has limited options to save Turkey from financial crisis | Reuters

Global Politics: Europe must break the shackles and show off its power - by Professor Zaki Laidi

EU: Only in unity can progress be achieved

Zaki Laidi professor of international relations at L’Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), who also was an adviser to former French prime minister Manuel Valls. recently wrote in an opinion piece, which is not only worth reading, but also implementing as part of the EU's  Parliament and Commissions long range strategy.

 "US President Donald Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker may have averted a trade war last month, but the challenges confronting the EU are far from resolved. In today’s increasingly Hobbesian global environment, the EU can survive only by increasing its capacity to project power — no easy feat for an entity that was formed precisely as a repudiation of power politics.

With the 1957 Treaty of Rome, Europe shed what remained of its militaristic impulses and focused on building a sprawling and peaceful single market. From then on, Europe’s only means of projecting power would be its trade policy. Yet that policy has never been guided by strategic thinking, leaving the EU with only limited global influence, despite its tremendous success in world markets. The time has come for Europe to reestablish itself as a true global player, not by attempting to emulate a classic superpower, but rather by consolidating and deploying different types of power.

Europe already has considerable normative power — that is, the capacity to create global standards through the so-called Brussels effect, which can be seen in its efforts to rein in technology companies.

The recently enacted General Data Protection Regulation, for example, set guidelines for the collection and processing of personal information of individuals within the EU. Now, digital platforms, including powerful American companies, are scrambling to adjust. The “big four” US tech firms — Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Apple, Facebook, and Amazon — are also facing pressure from the EU stemming from their dominant market position.

Yet the EU has often failed to recognize its normative power, let alone take full advantage of it. This both reflects and reinforces weakness in three areas: Self-esteem, risk awareness, and the capacity for action.

Self-esteem includes the belief that the EU is a worthy undertaking, the confidence to express that publicly, and recognition of the EU’s true potential for power projection. Such a dispensation is severely lacking in many parts of the EU, beginning with Germany, which, despite having regained confidence in its own future, jealously guards its resources.

As Trump berates Germany for accumulating surpluses without contributing sufficiently to transatlantic defense, the country should be all the more motivated to use its capabilities to strengthen Europe. But, while the discourse in Germany on resource-sharing has begun to shift, concrete changes will take time.

Europe’s unwillingness to nurture and deploy its clout contrasts sharply with America’s assertive use of its market power to advance its interests and preferences. For example, since Trump announced his decision to withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — better known as the Iran nuclear deal — and reinstate sanctions on Iran, many European companies, fearing loss of access to the US market, have decided to withdraw from the country.

To convince European companies to remain in Iran, the European Commission updated the 1996 Blocking Statute, which forbids actors under EU jurisdiction from complying with extraterritorial sanctions, allows companies to recover damages from such sanctions, and nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign court’s judgment based on them. But the update has proved ineffective, as exemplified by the situation faced by SWIFT, the secure messaging system used for global cross-border financial transactions.

As Iran learned in 2012, losing access to the SWIFT network essentially means losing access to the international financial system. Yet that is exactly what the US is pushing for: If SWIFT fails to cut off Iran by early November, it will face countermeasures. SWIFT’s compliance with that demand, however, would all but destroy any remaining incentive for Iran to remain in the JCPOA. This would amount to a major political failure for Europe, because SWIFT is under EU jurisdiction.

Europe has also shown a self-defeating lack of confidence in the euro. Although the euro is the world’s second most important currency, it lags behind the dollar on almost all metrics, increasing the EU’s vulnerability to US trade sanctions.

The second weakness the EU needs to address is risk awareness. For example, China needs access to Europe’s industrial technology to realize its economic ambitions, and it needs access to European ports to complete its Belt and Road Initiative. Yet Europe is allowing itself to be effectively plundered, not least by China’s takeover of ports and airport facilities. The EU-China relationship must be made more reciprocal, with the EU — and, in particular, the Southern and Eastern European countries that have welcomed Chinese investment with open arms — recognizing the security risks posed by Beijing’s activities.

For that to happen, however, Europe will need a more united approach to Russia, which, despite posing less of a threat to the EU than China does, is keen to highlight — and exacerbate — internal division. How can one blame Greece for selling ports to the Chinese while Germany pursues the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which will increase Europe’s energy dependency on Russia?

All of this is complicated by escalating tensions between Europe and the US, which, among other things, is spoiling cooperation to contain China. This is where the capacity for action comes in. Rather than waiting for someone else to push back against the Trump administration’s demolition of multilateral structures, Europe must take the initiative, imagining a system without the US.

This means not only ensuring that the international trade regime can survive without the US, but also developing a military capability that can increase the EU’s geopolitical credibility and shift the global balance of power. Here, French President Emmanuel Macron’s initiative to create a European military force beyond NATO is essential. Its success will hinge on a united, cooperative approach that potentially even includes the UK. The challenge is obvious. But the payoff — for the EU and the world — would be well worth the effort ". 

Note EU-Digest: Hopefully European political leaders at all levels of the European political spectrum will take note of this report by Professor Zaki Laidi. Europe must show far more courage to quickly undo itself from the US directed policy shackles and choose it's own independent course. If not, it will be devoured country by country in today’s increasingly Hobbesian global environment.

EU-Digest

USA: Donald Trump Is A Threat to Survival of Life on Earth ?: If Nuclear War Does - by Helena Wright

Since President Donald Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, the world has been looking towards other countries to pick up global leadership on climate change action. France recently announced that it plans to become the first country to phase out all oil and gas exploration and production by 2040, according to a draft bill. What does this signal for markets and other governments?

Is France stepping forward into a new era of global leadership on climate change?

Under the Paris Agreement on climate change, countries agreed to keep the global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees of warming and strive for 1.5 degrees. Impacts are still expected at 2 degrees of warming, but at least some of the world’s coral reefs could survive. Beyond this level, coral reefs, which a quarter of the world’s marine life and half a billion people depend on, are expected to be completely wiped out.

At the United Nations this week, French President Emmanuel Macron described the Paris climate deal as a “pact between generations” and has told Donald Trump that the climate deal will not be renegotiated. Macron also stated that the “door will always remain open” for America to re-join, and suggested he hopes to convince Trump to do so.

The terrifying math of climate change shows us that in order to stay within the 2-degree safety limit, the majority of the world’s existing fossil fuel reserves need to stay in the ground and not be burned.  Macron’s plans to rule out fossil fuel exploration are essential, as exploration for new fossil fuels risks pushing the world over dangerous thresholds. Climate change is an existential threat.  At six degrees of warming, which we could get if all remaining fossil fuels were burned, falling oxygen levels could be a threat to the survival of life on earth. France’s new policy to phase out oil and gas exploration is absolutely in line with the science, and if anything, the year of 2040 is too late – exploration needs to be ruled out earlier.

In the past year Macron has showed great leadership on climate change. After Trump’s withdrawal from the global climate agreement, Macron strongly rebuked Trump on this, and his twitter statement to “make the planet great again” rapidly went viral.

In July, Macron announced that France would ban sales of petrol and diesel cars by 2040, and this was followed by a similar announcement by the UK to tackle air pollution. Germany is considering a similar policy, while Norway had already decided it will only allowing sales of 100% electric or plug-in hybrid cars by 2025. China is also looking at ending the sales of fossil fuel cars, following France and the UK.

France is also a leader in the area of green finance, with the launch of a 7 billion euro green bond earlier this year - the largest and longest issuance of green bonds to date.  France has been a pioneer in the green bond market, and has also been the first nation to introduce mandatory climate and carbon risk reporting from institutional investors, pension funds and insurance companies.

Read more: Donald Trump Is A Threat to Survival of Life on Earth: If Nuclear War Doesn't Get Us, Falling Oxygen Levels Will